United States of America v. Sam Sando

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1065
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Sam Sando
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Central
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Submitted: December 18, 2025
Filed: May 19, 2026
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Before GRUENDER, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
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KELLY, Circuit Judge.
A federal jury convicted Sam Sando on several charges related to a shooting
that occurred on January 9, 2022. Sando appeals, challenging several of the district
court’s1 evidentiary rulings at trial. We affirm.
1 The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa.

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I.
On January 7, 2022, Andrew Meyer sent a message to Sando offering to sell
him marijuana. However, Meyer did not have any marijuana to sell. Instead, he
planned to sell Sando “fake weed” and use the money to buy fentanyl. Sando and
Meyer continued to message about the deal through the following day.
Then, early in the morning of January 9, Sando was involved in a domestic
dispute with Asatu Abalo, the mother of their child. Sando went to Abalo’s
apartment and, at about 2:00 a.m., Abalo called 911 to report a domestic assault.
Officer Rogelio Apolonio responded and, upon arrival, encountered a man—later
identified as Sando—leaving the apartment building. Apolonio went to Abalo’s
apartment, where she told him that Sando had just left and described the clothes he
was wearing, which matched the description of the man Apolonio had seen in the
hallway. Abalo said Sando had held a gun at her head in the presence of their one-
year-old son and had damaged the apartment. She described the gun as a black 9-
millimeter handgun with an “Ethika” sticker and showed Apolonio a photo of Sando
with the gun. Abalo also said that Sando told her, “Tomorrow, watch out. You’ll
hear gunfire.”
Later in the afternoon that same day, Sando was with his cousin Salifou Sahr
when he messaged Meyer to follow up on the marijuana deal. He explained he had
been delayed due to “issues” with Abalo but was now ready to meet. Shortly after
8:00 p.m., Meyer, along with Trishay Thompson and Alena Williams, went to 1426
Pennsylvania Avenue—the address Sando provided.
Sando then messaged Meyer and asked to meet at 1428 Pennsylvania Avenue
instead. Thompson drove Meyer and Williams to the new location and when they
arrived, Meyer received another message from Sando, this time asking him to come
inside the apartment and indicating that only Sando and his young son were home.
Although reluctant, Meyer was about to go in, but Thompson warned him not to.
Meyer then messaged Sando, asking him to come outside. Sando said to give him “a

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second” and that he was coming. Minutes later, Sando and Sahr approached the car
with guns drawn. Thompson started to drive away, but the two men fired and
Thompson was shot in the neck. He later died from his injuries. Both 9-millimeter
and .40-caliber casings were found on the ground near the car. Sando and Sahr were
arrested a week later. On Sando’s bed, law enforcement found several note cards,
including one that read “Escape Plan.”
Sando was charged with first degree murder in state court. In May 2023, he
was acquitted after a jury trial. In March 2024, Sando was charged in federal court
with (1) conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(a); (2) attempted interference with commerce by robbery, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1951(a); (3) attempted possession with intent to distribute a controlled
substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(D), 846 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2; and (4) carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
The case proceeded to trial, and the jury found Sando guilty on Counts 2, 3,
and 4.2 On appeal, Sando argues the district court erred in excluding from evidence
Abalo’s state court deposition and a portion of Williams’s testimony from the state
proceedings; limiting his ability to impeach a government witness; and admitting
evidence of domestic violence involving Sando and Abalo on January 9. We review
his challenges for an abuse of discretion, and we “will reverse only when an
improper evidentiary ruling affects the substantial rights of the defendant or when
we believe that the error has had more than a slight influence on the verdict.” United
States v. Allen, 43 F.4th 901, 909 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v.
Yarrington, 634 F.3d 440, 447 (8th Cir. 2011)).
2 Count 1 was dismissed before trial on the government’s motion.

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II.
Abalo did not testify at the federal trial, but the district court admitted
statements she made to Apolonio, including her description of the firearm and that
Sando told her there would be “gunfire” the next day. Sando sought to introduce
contrary statements Abalo made in her state court deposition—that she did not see
Sando with a gun on January 9 and that she did not remember much of what she told
the officers that night. The district court excluded the statements.
Sando argues that the district court erred because Abalo’s prior deposition
testimony was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 806.3 See Allen, 43 F.4th
at 909 (“Under Federal Rule of Evidence 806, when hearsay statements are admitted,
a party may impeach the credibility of the person who made those statements ‘by
any evidence that would be admissible for [impeachment] purposes if the declarant
had testified as a witness.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 806)).
Even assuming the evidence met the requirements of Rule 806, the
admissibility of this evidence was nevertheless subject to Rule 403. See Fed. R.
Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). After careful consideration, the
district court found that it would be unfairly prejudicial to admit Abalo’s deposition.
If the deposition were admitted, the court explained, the government would be
permitted to offer evidence to explain why Abalo may have given a contradictory
version of events in her deposition. Such evidence would include not only the
3 The district court also found the deposition was not admissible under Rule
807. Sando does not appeal that ruling—he challenges only its exclusion under Rule
806.

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previously excluded bodycam footage in its entirety,4 but also evidence that Sando
had violated a no-contact order by making over 300 recorded telephone calls to
Abalo from the local jail. The district court also made detailed findings that Abalo’s
deposition testimony lacked indicia of trustworthiness.5 And it expressly stated that
either party was free to call Abalo as a witness. Placed in context, we see no abuse
of discretion in the district court’s decision to exclude Abalo’s deposition on the
grounds that the prejudicial impact of its admission outweighed its limited probative
value.
III.
Next, Sando challenges the district court’s decision to exclude a prior
statement made by Alena Williams. At trial, Sando sought to admit prior state court
testimony from Williams to show that Meyer—not Sando—was the second shooter
on the night of January 9, 2022.6 At Sando’s state trial, Williams testified that, after
the shooting, Meyer sent her a message stating that “later on . . . he tried to get rid
of a gun, that he burnt it or put it in the lake[.]” Sando offered this statement to
support his assertion that Sahr shot at the car and Meyer shot back with his own
gun—thus accounting for the two types of ammunition found at the scene and
excluding Sando as a shooter. During an offer of proof, Meyer said he did not
remember sending such a message to Williams and denied having a gun that day.
4 In an earlier ruling, the district court allowed the government to play only the
portion of Apolonio’s bodycam footage depicting his brief encounter with Sando in
the hallway. The full footage included Abalo describing prior violent encounters with
Sando, showing Apolonio doors and walls she said Sando damaged, and pleading—
at one point on her knees—for assistance from law enforcement.
5 In her deposition, Abalo said she did not see Sando with a gun on January 9.
But the district court noted that Abalo twice attempted to assert her Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination; consistently said she could not remember what
happened on January 9 or what she told Apolonio; and claimed that anything she
said was due to her emotional state.
6 No one disputed that Sahr was one of the two shooters.

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Sando argues that Williams’s prior testimony was admissible as a statement
against interest—Meyer’s interest—under Rules 804(b)(3) and 613(b). To admit a
statement pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3): “(1) the declarant must be unavailable as a
witness, (2) the statement must so far tend to subject the declarant to criminal
liability such that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have
made the statement unless he [] believed it to be true, and (3) corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.” United States
v. Alexander, 114 F.4th 967, 971–72 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v.
Honken, 541 F.3d 1146, 1161 (8th Cir. 2008)); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).
The district court found Meyer was not “unavailable” for purposes of the Rule.
Sando characterized Meyer as unavailable because he did not remember making the
statement. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(3) (A declarant is “unavailable” for purposes of
Rule 804 if the declarant “testifies to not remembering the subject matter.”). The
court disagreed, finding that Meyer did not simply say he did not remember the
statement, but also said he would not have made the statement. And apart from
Williams’s prior testimony, there was no evidence that he did.7 Law enforcement
found no such message on Williams’s phone. And Sando offered nothing but
hearsay—Williams’s testimony about something Meyer said—to establish that
Meyer made the statement. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) (allowing admission of
unavailable witness’s statement against interest if it “is supported by corroborating
circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness”). We discern no abuse of
discretion in the district court’s evidentiary ruling.
For the first time on appeal, Sando also argues Williams’s prior statement was
not hearsay—and was therefore admissible—because it was “inconsistent with [her]
testimony and was given under penalty of perjury at a trial.” Fed. R. Evid.
7 The district court permitted Sando to ask Meyer on cross examination
whether he made the statement, but Sando would “have to take whatever his answer
is.” The court agreed that Meyer could be impeached with extrinsic evidence of the
message itself but found there was no evidence the message existed. See Fed. R.
Evid. 613(b).

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801(d)(1)(A) (“A statement . . . is not hearsay if the declarant testifies and is subject
to cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement is inconsistent with
the declarant’s testimony and was given under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing,
or other proceeding or in a deposition.” (citation modified)). Reviewing this
argument for plain error, we find none. See United States v. Brown, 88 F.4th 750,
758 (8th Cir. 2023) (reviewing for plain error appellant’s evidentiary challenge
raised “for the first time on appeal” (citing United States v. Torrez, 925 F.3d 391,
395 (8th Cir. 2019))). As an initial matter, Sando overstates the inconsistency
between Williams’s testimony at his federal trial and her testimony in the state
proceedings.8 In any event, Williams’s testimony about something that Meyer—or
anyone else—told her is hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Sando’s only response
is that Meyer’s embedded statement about getting rid of a gun is nevertheless
admissible pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3), but we have already concluded that the
district court did not err in finding it was not. We see no plain error here.
IV.
Sando also contends that the district court erred in limiting his ability to
impeach Detective Benjamin Carter, who interviewed Williams about the events of
January 9. 9 On cross examination, Sando asked Carter whether Williams lied to him
during the interview. Carter answered that he thought Williams “minimize[ed] . . .
her knowledge of what occurred” because she had experienced “a traumatic
incident,” but otherwise thought she was “forthright [and] credible.” Sando then
asked, “So, there’s never [] any point in which you say that she was lying to you?”
8 In state court, Williams said Meyer sent her a message about getting rid of a
gun. At Sando’s federal trial, Williams could not recall whether Meyer sent her a
message or someone simply told her this information.
9 We review this evidentiary challenge for an abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Stewart, 32 F.4th 691, 694 & n.4 (8th Cir. 2022) (reviewing challenge to
scope of cross-examination under abuse of discretion instead of de novo because a
confrontation clause challenge was not raised).

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The district court sustained the government’s hearsay objection and did not permit
Carter to answer.
Sando later made an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury to flesh out
his objection. Sando explained that, in a recording of Carter’s interview with
Williams, “Carter says . . . to Williams she was not just holding back, she was lying
to him.” Sando intended to impeach Carter with this prior inconsistent statement.
The district court declined to reconsider its ruling, finding that Sando could not use
what the court considered to be a law enforcement interview technique for
impeachment purposes.
Carter’s contemporaneous characterization of Williams’s truthfulness at the
interview differed from his characterization of the same at trial. Perhaps Carter
considered it an interview technique, perhaps not. Either way, if asked about the
arguable inconsistency between the two statements, Carter would have the
opportunity to explain it to the jury. And the jury could consider that explanation
just as it considers any other testimony in assessing the credibility and veracity of a
witness. See United States v. Chambers, 133 F.4th 812, 816 (8th Cir. 2025) (“It is
within the province of the jury to make credibility assessments and resolve
conflicting testimony.” (citation omitted)). We see no reason on the record to limit
Sando’s ability to impeach Carter with his prior inconsistent statement. Cf. United
States v. Campbell, 986 F.3d 782, 794 (8th Cir. 2021) (recognizing reasonable limits
on cross examination could be based on factors such as harassment, prejudice, or
confusion of the issues) (citation omitted).
Turning to whether the error was harmless, Sando asserts that Williams’s
credibility was key to his defense. Williams testified that Meyer did not get out of
the car until after the shots were fired. If credited, her testimony would eliminate
Meyer as the second shooter. According to Sando, his proposed question to Carter
would have impeached the credibility of both Carter and Williams, in turn bolstering
his assertion that it was Meyer, not Sando, who was the second shooter.

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But the jury also heard evidence directly from Meyer that he was in the car
when shots were fired. Meyer said he ducked before reaching over to apply the
brakes when Thompson—the driver—was struck. When shown security camera
footage, Meyer also said he “remember[ed] . . . doing that stuff” depicted, including
getting out of the car and running around to the driver’s side to check on Thompson.
Meyer’s testimony corroborated Williams’s testimony that both Meyer and
Thompson were in the car when shots were fired and that Meyer only got out when
the car stopped moving. The jury also heard testimony that there was fragmented
glass on the ground outside the driver and passenger doors. A law enforcement
officer explained that because car windows are made of safety glass, the windows
would not have shattered until the car doors were opened and then closed again,
providing further support for the finding that Meyer remained in the car until after
the shots were fired. On this record, Sando’s inability to impeach Carter with a single
inconsistent statement had no “more than a slight influence on the verdict.” Allen,
43 F.4th at 909 (quoting Yarrington, 634 F.3d at 447); see also United States v. May,
131 F.4th 633, 642 (8th Cir. 2025) (“We ‘will reverse a district court's limitation of
cross-examination only where there has been a clear abuse of discretion and a
showing of prejudice to the defendant.’” (quoting United States v. Alston, 626 F.3d
397, 403 (8th Cir. 2010))).
V.
Lastly, Sando asserts the district court erred when it admitted, under Rule
404(b), evidence of “allegations of domestic assault” between Sando and Abalo on
January 9. However, the district court found this evidence was admissible as intrinsic
to the charged offenses, and Sando does not challenge that ruling on appeal, giving
us no reason to disturb it.
VI.
We affirm.
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