Glendy Amelida Lopez De Leon De Hernandez; A.I.H.L. v. Todd Blanche,1 Acting Attorney General of the United States

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1298
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Glendy Amelida Lopez De Leon De Hernandez; A.I.H.L.
Petitioners
v.
Todd Blanche,1 Acting Attorney General of the United States
Respondent
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Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
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Submitted: March 16, 2026
Filed: May 12, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before SHEPHERD, ERICKSON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM
Guatemalan citizens Glendy Amelida Lopez De Leon De Hernandez and her
minor child, A.I.H.L., petition for review of an order from the Board of Immigration
1 Todd Blanche was designated as Acting Attorney General of the United
States and is substituted as Respondent pursuant Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 43(c).

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Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing their appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial
of De Hernandez’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture. Because substantial evidence supports the
IJ’s adverse credibility determination, we deny the petition.
On March 5, 2018, De Hernandez and A.I.H.L. entered the United States and
were paroled into the country. After removal proceedings were initiated against
them, De Hernandez filed the underlying application.2 De Hernandez stated that her
husband was physically abusive, forced her to have sexual relations with him, and
threatened to kill her if she ever reported him to the police. In support of her
application, De Hernandez filed affidavits from her brother, Edin Isaac Lopez De
Leon, and two of her friends, Maria Antonieta Gomez Gomez and Liria Izabel Santos
Cardona. De Leon and Cardona recounted an incident in 2016 where unknown men
stole money from a bakery De Hernandez purportedly owned and attempted to extort
more money from her by leaving three dead animals in front of the bakery.
On February 11, 2022, the IJ held a merits hearing on De Hernandez’s
application. Shortly before the hearing, De Hernandez filed a personal affidavit
detailing the abuse she suffered at the hands of her husband. She also described
abuse inflicted upon her by her parents starting at age 6 and sexual abuse she suffered
around the ages of 12 to 17 from men who worked at her parents’ bakery. During
the hearing De Hernandez testified and further elaborated on the abuse she suffered
from her husband, parents, and the men who worked at the bakery as well as her
attempts to leave her husband.
Although the IJ believed De Hernandez “experienced some forms of violence
and threats in Guatemala,” she specifically found De Hernandez did not testify
credibly in support of her application. The IJ cited omissions and inconsistencies
2 A.I.H.L. was named as a derivative beneficiary of De Hernandez’s asylum
claim. The “derivative” asylum statute permits a “spouse or child” of an applicant
who qualifies for asylum to derive asylum through that applicant. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(3)(A).

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between her testimony and the documentary evidence. The IJ also questioned the
reliability of the affidavits filed by De Hernandez’s brother and friends because they
all bore the same date, were from the same attorney, and contained similar language.
Without credible testimony supporting her application, the IJ determined De
Hernandez had failed to meet her burden of proof. Alternatively, the IJ found that
even if De Hernandez had testified credibly, she failed to articulate a cognizable
social group and could not establish an objectively reasonable fear of future
persecution. The BIA found no clear error in the IJ’s adverse credibility
determination and dismissed De Hernandez’s appeal.
De Hernandez argues the adverse credibility determination was clearly
erroneous. We review credibility determinations for substantial evidence. Coto-
Albarenga v. Garland, 4 F.4th 628, 631 (8th Cir. 2021). Under the substantial
evidence standard, this Court only reverses if “any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. (quotation omitted). Consequently, “it
is a rare case where an adverse credibility determination is disturbed on appeal.”
Tian v. Barr, 932 F.3d 664, 668 (8th Cir. 2019). Still, the IJ must provide “specific,
cogent reasons for disbelief” and “cannot rely on trivial details or easily explained
discrepancies.” Id. (quotation omitted). The IJ’s reasons for disbelief must be
“specific enough for a reviewing court to understand the rationale behind the
decision and convincing enough that a reasonable adjudicator would not be
compelled to reach a contrary result.” Gonzalez v. Garland, 29 F.4th 989, 995 (8th
Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Here, the IJ provided specific, cogent reasons for her adverse credibility
determination. First, De Hernandez was inconsistent regarding her attempts to leave
her husband, which was material to her asylum claim. See Garcia v. Barr, 954 F.3d
1095, 1098 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing inconsistencies in “whether [petitioner] could
successfully leave” her husband as supporting an adverse credibility determination).
Despite not mentioning any attempts to leave her husband in her I-589 application
or affidavit, De Hernandez indicated she made multiple attempts to leave her
husband by stating she “first” tried to leave him in 2015 and whenever she tried to

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leave him “he would always come get [her] and threaten [her] that [she] had to get
back home.” But in her testimony De Hernandez claimed she only left her husband
once in 2015 for three days. Second, her affidavit and I-589 application only
mentioned filing a police report with Guatemalan authorities in February of 2018,
but she testified that she had filed an earlier complaint with the police in 2013, which
she could not corroborate. Third, De Leon’s and Cardona’s affidavits provided a
graphic account of attempted extortion of a bakery De Hernandez owned, but De
Hernandez testified that her parents owned the bakery, not her, and she never
mentioned any attempted extortion. See Litvinov v. Holder, 605 F.3d 548, 555–556
(8th Cir. 2010) (affirming adverse credibility determination where the applicant’s
testimony “did not match the . . . testimony of other witnesses”).
Finally, the IJ described De Hernandez’s demeanor as “flippant” when
confronted with omissions in her I-589 application and affidavit. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (allowing an IJ to “base a credibility determination on the
demeanor . . . of the applicant”). This left the IJ concerned that De Hernandez was
“exaggerating or embellishing her testimony” at the hearing. Ultimately, the IJ
found there were just too many omissions and inconsistencies between De
Hernandez’s testimony and the documentary evidence to make a favorable
credibility determination. Substantial evidence in the record supports that
determination.
For these reasons, we deny the petition for review.
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