United States of America v. Antone Little

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1529
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Antone Little
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
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Submitted: January 16, 2026
Filed: May 15, 2026
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Before SMITH, BENTON, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
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ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.
Antone Little pled guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(8), and one count of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). He was sentenced to a 235-month term of
imprisonment. On appeal, Little asserts the district court erred when it applied a
four-level enhancement under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(13)(A) for knowingly

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misrepresenting or marketing a substance containing fentanyl as another substance.
Little also asserts the district court committed plain error when it found him
ineligible for federal benefits under 21 U.S.C. § 862(a)(1)(C). We affirm the term
of imprisonment imposed by the district court, but we vacate the permanent denial
of federal benefits.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 14, 2023, St. Louis police received a tip from a confidential
informant that “Ant,” later identified as Antone Little, was distributing narcotics
from a residence on Kennerly Avenue in St. Louis. The informant reported that
Little would exit the residence from a rear door or side door, collect cash from
customers, return to the residence to obtain the drugs, and exit the residence to
provide the customers with narcotics. An investigative team surveilled the residence
for two weeks and observed transactions as described by the confidential informant.
On March 28, 2023, the investigative team conducted a controlled buy using the
confidential informant. The informant bought $40 worth of crack cocaine from
Little and also observed Little sell a woman fentanyl capsules. Detectives obtained
a search warrant and three days later searched the residence. In the front room, they
recovered a 9mm handgun, a shotgun, a revolver, two bags of empty pill capsules, a
pill capper, narcotics, and a blender with white residue. In Little’s bedroom,
detectives found 1,633 yellow tablets marked with “C <>230” containing 854.24
grams of fentanyl.
While the detectives were searching the residence, the lead investigator,
Detective Ryan Drago, interviewed Little. Little told Detective Drago that he
purchased the yellow tablets for approximately $1,000. According to Detective
Drago’s report, Little also said the yellow tablets were imitation oxycodone pills
laced with fentanyl and methamphetamine. The report quoted Little as saying, “Hey
if you are dumb enough to believe I am selling Oxycodone at this cheap of a price
then you stupid as hell. If they overdose, then oh well. That is part of the game.”

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Little was indicted on one count of felon in possession of a firearm, one count
of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and one count of
possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Little signed a plea
agreement in which he pled guilty to the first two counts. The plea agreement left
open whether Little was subject to a four-level enhancement under USSG
§ 2D1.1(b)(13)(A) for knowingly misrepresenting or marketing a substance
containing fentanyl as another substance.
At sentencing, Detective Logan Priddy testified that he helped execute the
search warrant and heard portions of Detective Drago’s interview of Little.1
Detective Priddy testified to the contents of Detective Drago’s report, including
statements in the report that Little disputes making. Detective Priddy also testified
that Little referred to the yellow pills as being “China yellow,” which typically refers
to fentanyl. Detective Priddy further explained the “C<>230” on the yellow pills
indicates oxycodone whereas fentanyl usually is encapsulated in multi-colored gel
capsules.
Little testified and denied making the statements in Detective Drago’s report,
although he also noted that he was under the influence of heroin during the interview.
According to Little, he received the yellow pills from a man he did side work with
who he knew as “Kevin.” Little testified that Kevin found the yellow pills in a vacant
building and asked Little to hold onto them because Kevin was homeless. Little also
testified that he intended to give the yellow pills back to Kevin and that he did not
intend to sell the drugs.
The district court found that Little knew the fake oxycodone pills in his
possession were actually fentanyl and that he marketed them. The district court
applied the four-level enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(13)(A) and sentenced Little to
a total of 235 months’ imprisonment. The district court also deemed Little
1 Detective Drago was not available to testify due to an out-of-state military
deployment.

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permanently ineligible for federal benefits. Little appeals the application of the four-
level enhancement and his permanent ineligibility for federal benefits.
II. DISCUSSION
In reviewing a sentence for procedural error, we review the district court’s
factual findings to support an enhancement for clear error and the district court’s
interpretation of the Guidelines de novo. United States v. Hernandez Lopez, 24 F.4th
1205, 1208 (8th Cir. 2022). “Clear error exists only when we are left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
Red Elk, 132 F.4th 1100, 1105 (8th Cir. 2025) (quotation omitted).
First, Little asserts the district court clearly erred in finding that he made the
statements quoted in Detective Drago’s report. Specifically, Little contends the
district court should not have considered Detective Drago’s report, which was
hearsay.2 But a sentencing court is allowed to consider relevant information without
regard to the rules of evidence that are generally applicable at trial. This includes
considering hearsay or even double hearsay so long as the court has sufficient indicia
of reliability to support the evidence’s probable accuracy. United States v. Harris,
44 F.4th 819, 822 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting USSG § 6A1.3(a)). In assessing the
reliability of hearsay evidence, the district court considers factors such as “the
consistency of the hearsay testimony, the timing and nature of the declarant’s
statements, and the witness’s impressions of the declarant’s demeanor, as well as
other corroborating evidence.” United States v. Campos, 79 F.4th 903, 916 (8th Cir.
2023) (quotation omitted). The reliability of evidence is left to the sound discretion
of the trial court. Id.
Here, Detective Priddy’s testimony corroborated Detective Drago’s report.
While Detective Priddy was not present for the entire interview, he observed some
2 Little’s statements to Detective Drago were not hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2).

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of it and found Little to be “cooperative.” Consistent with Detective Drago’s report,
Detective Priddy heard Little describe the pills as “China yellow,” suggesting to
Detective Priddy that Little knew the yellow pills were fentanyl and not oxycodone.
Little himself testified at sentencing that he thought the yellow pills were fake
because there were “too many pills to be real.” He further acknowledged that
someone purchasing one of the yellow pills would believe it to be oxycodone.
Detective Priddy testified that fentanyl was cheaper than oxycodone, and Little
corroborated Detective Priddy’s testimony that oxycodone sold for about $20 per
pill.
Little’s attempts to discredit Detective Drago’s report were unconvincing.
Although Little denied making the statements in Detective Drago’s report, he also
admitted to being under the influence of heroin during his interview. To the extent
Little testified that heroin did not alter his state of mind, the district court found his
“testimony about the effects of heroin on him inconsistent, not credible, and quite
dodgy.” Further, Little denied telling Detective Drago that he paid approximately
$1,000 for the yellow pills, but in his plea agreement, he admitted to making that
statement.3 Little’s testimony that he was holding the yellow pills for a man who
went by “Kevin” similarly strained credulity. Little knew almost nothing about the
man he referred to as “Kevin” and even testified that he did not think “Kevin” was
the man’s real name. Even so, Little testified that he held onto the pills at great risk
to himself and his family for no apparent reward, if his testimony is believed. The
district court committed no error, clear or otherwise, when it credited Detective
Drago’s report.
Little next contends the district court erred in applying the enhancement
because there was no evidence of an actual sale or misrepresentation by Little, but
this Court has upheld the application of § 2D1.1(b)(13) without evidence of an actual
3 In his plea agreement, Little specifically denied telling detectives the yellow
pills were imitation oxycodone and denied making the quoted statement. Little,
however, agreed that he “informed detectives that he purchased the yellow oval pills
earlier that week for approximately one thousand dollars.”

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sale. See United States v. Salinas, 132 F.4th 1083 (8th Cir. 2025).4 In Salinas, the
defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled
substance, which included fentanyl pills marked M-30 “that resembled oxycodone.”
Id. at 1086. The defendant argued § 2D1.1(b)(13) did not apply because “no
evidence exists that he ‘represented or marketed the fentanyl pills as oxycodone.’”
Id. at 1090. This Court disagreed because “the quantity that Salinas possessed, the
packages’ markings, and the manner of wrapping demonstrated an intention to
distribute to different customers.” Id. at 1091.
Similarly, the evidence here supports a conclusion that Little was marketing
the imitation oxycodone even if the government could not point to a specific sale.
Little admitted to possessing with intent to distribute fentanyl pills that were yellow
and marked with “C<>230,” resembling oxycodone. See United States v. Matthews,
155 F.4th 845, 851 (6th Cir. 2025) (defining “marketing” as “the act of holding forth
property for sale, together with activities preparatory thereto.”) (quoting Asgrow
Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995)). Little possessed a distribution
amount of the imitation oxycodone pills and was observed selling other narcotics.
Little admitted to purchasing the 1,633 pills for $1,000, but he knew the going rate
for real oxycodone pills was “three for 60,” indicating an intent to turn a profit by
selling the fentanyl pills as oxycodone. Little demonstrated a knowledge of the
market for the pills by testifying that the “clientele base” was “from 13 to 27” and
stating, “I can walk outside and sell them.” Notably, Little told Detective Drago,
“Hey if you are dumb enough to believe I am selling oxycodone at this cheap of a
price then you stupid as hell,” which suggests that Little was selling the imitation
oxycodone. And Little’s stated reason for possessing the imitation oxycodone
pills—that he was holding them for a man named Kevin who he did not know—
4 The district court in Salinas applied the two-level enhancement under
§ 2D1.1(b)(13)(B), rather than the four-level enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(13)(A)
that is applicable here. The difference between the two enhancements is the mens
rea—subsection (A) requires knowledge that the substance contains fentanyl while
subsection (B) only requires a reckless disregard. Because Little’s mens rea is not
at issue, that distinction is immaterial.

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lacked credibility. The district court did not err in applying § 2D1.1(b)(13) despite
the lack of evidence of an actual sale.
Even if the district court had erred in applying the four-level enhancement,
any error was harmless. An erroneous Guidelines calculation is harmless when the
district court “indicates it would have alternatively imposed the same sentence even
if a lower guideline range applied.” United States v. Martinez, 821 F.3d 984, 989
(8th Cir. 2016). Here, the district court explained that it “would impose the same
sentence regardless of the objections and regardless of [its] findings as to the
enhancements . . . .” Still, the district court’s “alternative sentence must be
substantively reasonable.” Id. In support of alternatively imposing the same
sentence, the district court explained that Little “had a substantial amount of lethal
doses [of fentanyl] in his possession, and he was protecting them with firearms.”
We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentencing decision. See United
States v. Cortez, 72 F.4th 1344, 1345 (8th Cir. 2023) (finding “fentanyl’s unique
lethality” supported an upward variance).
Finally, Little argues the district court plainly erred in finding him
permanently ineligible for federal benefits. The government concedes the district
court plainly erred when it found Little permanently ineligible for federal benefits.
Under 21 U.S.C. § 862(a)(1)(C), an individual convicted of an offense “consisting
of the distribution of controlled substances” is permanently ineligible for federal
benefits “upon a third or subsequent conviction.” Little, however, was convicted of
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, not distribution of a
controlled substance, and only one of his prior state convictions was for distribution
of a controlled substance.5 See United States v. Phillips, 124 F.4th 522, 527 (8th
Cir. 2024) (distinguishing possessing a controlled substance from distributing it
when considering the denial of benefits under § 862(a)(1)(C)). Incorrect application
of § 862(a)(1)(C) constitutes plain error affecting the defendant’s substantial rights.
5 That conviction was expunged under Missouri law, but we need not decide
the impact of the expungement.

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Id. at 528–29. We reverse and vacate the district court’s decision finding Little
permanently ineligible for federal benefits.
III. CONCLUSION
We vacate the permanent denial of federal benefits under 21 U.S.C.
§ 862(a)(1)(C) but otherwise affirm the judgment of the district court.
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