Emmanuel Dwah Tiah v. Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General of the United States

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 24-2010
___________________________
Emmanuel Dwah Tiah
Petitioner
v.
Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General of the United States
Respondent
____________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
____________
Submitted: December 17, 2025
Filed: June 8, 2026
____________
Before LOKEN, SMITH, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
____________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Emmanuel Tiah, a native and citizen of Liberia, petitions for review
of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA found him
removable as charged pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). The BIA based its
decision on Tiah’s two North Dakota convictions for violating protection orders. It
further found him ineligible for any form of relief or protection from removal. We
must answer two questions to resolve Tiah’s petition: First, whether copies of the

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actual protection orders at issue were required to determine whether Tiah was
removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). Second, even assuming copies were
not required, whether the record was sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the protection orders satisfied the requirements of § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).
Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) provides that the protection orders issued against
Tiah must satisfy three requirements: (1) the protection orders were issued against
Tiah for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts of domestic violence;
(2) a portion of the protection orders “involve[d] protection against credible threats
of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury”; and (3) a court determined that
Tiah engaged in conduct that violated that portion of the protection order. See Docket
for Tiah v. Bondi, 8th Cir. No. 24-2010 (May 20, 2025). We hold that copies of the
actual protection orders were not required to determine Tiah’s removability under
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). We also hold that the record sufficiently established the
elements of § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, we
deny the petition for review.
I. Background
Tiah entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident on May 24,
2010, pursuant to the diversity visa lottery. In early 2021, Tiah ran afoul of relevant
North Dakota law. A docket report from the State of North Dakota reveals that on
January 18, 2021, Tiah was charged in Case No. 09-2021-CR-00245 with (1)
“Disorderly conduct-Fighting behavior,” in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31-
01(1)(a), and (2) “Terrorizing-With a dangerous weapon-Adult Victim-DV,” in
violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-17-04(1). A.R. 492. Two days later, the first protection
order was issued against Tiah; specifically, a “Pre Disposition” “Order Prohibiting
Contact” was entered in the case. Id. at 493. The text of this protection order is not
in the record.
Another docket report from the State of North Dakota shows that on January
25, 2021, Tiah was charged in a separate filing in Case No. 09-2021-cr-00389 with
“Violation of an order prohibiting contact.” Id. at 495 (citing N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-

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02(4) (“An individual who violates a court order issued under this section is guilty
of a class A misdemeanor.”).
The information filed the following day against Tiah stated:
Count 1: VIOLATION OF AN ORDER PROHIBITING
CONTACT in violation of Section 12.1-31.2-02(4), 12.1-32-01(5)
(CST # C00895), N.D.C.C. in that on or about January 25, 2021: the
defendant willfully violated a court order prohibiting contact issued
under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02[1] to-wit: that on or about the above-
stated date, the defendant, EMMANUEL DWAH TIAH, came within
300 yards of Rose Tiah in violation of an order prohibiting contact.
Id. at 508 (bold and underline omitted). The related police report contained the facts
underlying the charge. The report described an officer’s investigation at Tiah’s home
in conjunction with a social worker. The description included the officer’s basis for
believing that Tiah was present in the home and law enforcement’s subsequent
discovery of Tiah hiding in the home. Based on the officer’s observation of Tiah’s
presence within the 300 yards prohibited by the protection order, he sought the filing
1 Section 12.1-31.2-02(1)(a), titled “Order prohibiting conduct,” provides:
If an individual is charged with, arrested for, or subject to a sentence or
order deferring imposition of sentence for a crime of violence or threat
of violence, stalking, harassment, or a sex offense, the court authorizing
the release of the individual, imposing a sentence, or issuing an order
deferring imposition of sentence, shall consider and may issue an order
prohibiting the individual from having contact with the victim. The
order must contain the court’s directives and must inform the individual
that any violation of the order constitutes a criminal offense. The state’s
attorney shall provide a copy of the order to the victim. The court shall
determine at the time of the individual’s arraignment whether an order
issued pursuant to this section will be extended. If the court issues an
order pursuant to this section before the time the individual is charged,
the order expires at the individual’s arraignment or within seventy-two
hours of issuance if charges against the individual are not filed.

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of a charge for violating the court order against Tiah “for being in the home with the
protected party, Rose Tiah, on the date of 1/25/2021, when he was located by
officers.” Id. at 509.
A third docket report from the State of North Dakota provides that on March
19, 2021, Tiah was charged in Case No. 09-2021-cr-01187 with “Violation of an
order prohibiting contact,” in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02(4). Id. at 499.
The information, filed the same day, described the charged conduct:
Count 1: VIOLATION OF AN ORDER PROHIBITING
CONTACT in violation of Section 12.1-31.2-02(4), 12.1-32-01(5)
(CST # C00895), N.D.C.C. in that on or about March 19, 2021: The
defendant willfully violated a court order prohibiting contact issued
under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02 to-wit: that on or about the above-styled
date, the defendant, EMMANUEL DWAH TIAH, willfully violated a
court order prohibiting contact issued under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02
regarding Rose Tiah issued in case 09-2021-CR-245.
Id. at 516 (bold and underline omitted). The police report recounted the officer’s
investigation into a call from Rose Tiah. She was concerned for her safety after Tiah
had been released from custody. Rose showed the officer text messages that she had
received from Tiah. The officer verified the active status of the protection order,
which prohibited Tiah from “contact[ing] Rose electronically or in person.” Id. at
517. Upon law enforcement locating Tiah, he “admitted to contacting Rose.” Id.
The docket reports show that on May 21, 2021, Tiah pleaded guilty to the
charge of “Violation of an order prohibiting contact” in Case No. 09-2021-cr-01187
and pleaded guilty to that same charge in Case No. 09-2021-00389. Id. at 442, 495.
Criminal judgments were entered in both cases.
The docket report in Case No. 09-2021-CR-00245 reflects that Tiah pleaded
guilty on June 4, 2021, to “Disorderly conduct-Fighting behavior.” Id. at 492. The
charge of “Terrorizing-With a dangerous weapon-Adult Victim-DV” was dismissed.
Id. North Dakota’s disorderly conduct statute provides that a person is guilty of a

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Class B misdemeanor “if, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person or in
reckless disregard of the fact that another person is harassed, annoyed, or alarmed
by the individual’s behavior, the individual . . . [e]ngages in fighting, or in violent,
tumultuous, or threatening behavior.” N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31-01(1)(a). That same day,
a “Post-Disposition” “Order Prohibiting Contact” was entered in the case. A.R. 493.
This order prohibiting contact is not in the record. The post-disposition order was
dismissed on January 6, 2022. Id.2
On May 23, 2023, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served Tiah
with a Notice to Appear (NTA) charging him with being removable under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) as
an alien who . . . after entry has been enjoined under a protection order
and has been determined to have engaged in conduct in violation of that
order that involves protection against credible threats of violence,
repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom
the protection order was issued.
Id. at 546; see also id. at 549.
Tiah appeared pro se at his initial removal hearing. At the hearing, Tiah
admitted that his “wife” obtained a protection order against him on January 20, 2021,
id. at 255, and that the state court “conclude[d] that [he] violated that protection
order,” id. at 258. Based on the record, the immigration judge (IJ) sustained the
charge by DHS alleging that Tiah “has been enjoined under a protection order and
has been . . . determined to have engaged in conduct in violation of that order that
involves protection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment or
bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the protection order was issued.” Id.
2 As the government notes, “The record also contains evidence of Tiah’s
convictions pursuant to guilty pleas for violations of protection orders on other
occasions, but those convictions were explicitly not considered by the Board in its
analysis.” Resp’t’s Suppl. Br. 6 n.1. As a result, we will not consider that evidence.

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at 261–62. The IJ informed Tiah that he could apply for cancellation of removal and
other relief, and Tiah subsequently submitted those applications.
At the final removal hearing, Tiah, again acting pro se, testified why his wife
Rose obtained the “first restraining order in 2021.” Id. at 299. According to Tiah, he
and Rose had argued over her not returning his debit card. After Tiah took the debit
card, Rose “wanted to fight” and ultimately called the police. Id. at 300. Tiah
testified, “So when the police came . . . [Rose] told the police that, uh, I terrorize her,
I wanted to fight her; in fact, I pick a knife for her.” Id. Tiah went to jail as a result,
and the state court entered the no-contact order. Tiah explained that when the no-
contact order was entered, he had COVID-19 and “nowhere to go.” Id. at 301. As a
result, he returned home despite the no-contact order. This return generated the first
violation.
Tiah also testified about the March 19, 2021 violation of the no-contact order.
He admitted that there was a “no-contact order” in place against him. Id. at 305, 306.
Rose “called the police” and reported that Tiah was contacting her. Id. at 307. The
police questioned Tiah about whether he had “been in contact with Rose,” and he
responded, “no.” Id. He explained that the police arrested him “because Rose told
[the police] that [he] ha[d] texted her.” Id.
In an oral decision, the IJ reiterated its prior determination sustaining the
allegations against Tiah:
Based on the facts that the record clearly indicates that an individual by
the name of Rose Tiah acquired a No Contact Order against [Tiah]
requiring him to remain a certain distance away from her and
prohibiting him from having contact with her. [Tiah’s] offenses took
place in the domestic context of a husband and wife. Each of the
convictions referenced in the Notice to Appear relative to the no-
contact order violations, as well as the corresponding conviction
records, indicate violations of the provisions of the no-contact order
prohibiting [Tiah] from having contact with Ms. [Rose] Tiah. As such,
the Court sustained the single charge by clear and convincing evidence.

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Id. at 175–76 (strikethrough and underline omitted). The IJ also denied Tiah’s
cancellation of removal request. The IJ found his multiple violations of no-contact
orders as well as drinking and driving offenses weighed against granting relief.
Tiah, now with counsel, appealed to the BIA. He raised five arguments: (1)
the proceedings should have been terminated because the post-disposition no-
contact order was lifted in 2022, before immigration authorities detained him in May
2023; (2) the government failed to meet its burden of proving that he was removable
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) due to the insufficiency of the record, which
lacked the actual court orders that Tiah allegedly violated; (3) the IJ erred in denying
cancellation of removal because it ignored positive factors; (4) Tiah’s due process
rights were violated when the IJ did not obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of
his right to counsel; and (5) the IJ should have inquired into his eligibility for a
waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(7)(A).3
The BIA dismissed the appeal. It first concluded that Tiah’s convictions for
violating valid no-contact orders made case termination unwarranted. It noted that
those orders “were effective for the duration of 2021, and [Tiah] was convicted of
violating the effective orders on multiple occasions.” Id. at 4. The BIA next
determined that the no-contact convictions and correlating charging documents
“clearly establishe[d] that the violations in question related to a protective order that
was issued under a state legal provision that meets the requirements for removability
under” § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). Id. The BIA explained:
Specifically, for his May 21, 2021, convictions (09-2021-CR-00389
and 09-2021-CR-01187), [Tiah] pleaded guilty to “count 1” of the
January 26, 2021, information, and “count 1” of the March 19, 2021,
information, which both state that [Tiah] violated a no-contact order
issued under section 12.1-31.2-02 of the North Dakota Century Code
3 Section 1227(a)(7)(A) authorizes waiving removability “in the case of an
alien who has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty and who is not and was
not the primary perpetrator of violence in the relationship.”

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(Exh. 2 at 3, 11). Section 12.1-31.2-02 of the North Dakota Century
Code specifically provides the grounds for issuing a no-contact order:
“If an individual who is charged with or arrested for a crime of violence
or threat of violence, stalking, harassment, or a sex offense is released
from custody before arraignment or trial, the court authorizing the
release of the individual shall consider and may issue an order
prohibiting the individual from having contact with the victim.”
Preventing contact between the alleged perpetrator of a “crime of
violence or threat of violence, stalking, harassment, or a sex offense”
and the alleged victim is necessarily “an injunction issued for the
purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts of domestic violence”
under section 237(a)(2)(E)(ii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).4
Based on the foregoing, [Tiah’s] May 21, 2021, convictions establish
his removability under section 237(a)(2)(E)(ii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).
Id. at 4–5.
The BIA also concluded that the IJ appropriately applied its discretion in
denying Tiah cancellation of removal. As to Tiah’s due process claim based on a
lack of counsel, the BIA stated that the record belied Tiah’s allegations. It also noted
that Tiah failed to show prejudice by the lack of representation. Finally, it determined
that Tiah was not prima facie eligible for a domestic violence waiver.
Tiah, acting pro se, petitioned for review of the of the BIA’s order dismissing
his appeal of the IJ’s decision. In his pro se brief, Tiah renewed the arguments that
he raised in his administrative appeal to the BIA. As to his removability, he asserted
that the record evidence was insufficient to establish that he is removable because
the actual January and June 2021 orders prohibiting contact are absent. The absence
of those documents, he contends, means that there is no proof that his violations of
the orders involved protection against credible threats of violence.
4 “[Tiah] d[id] not dispute that these offenses took place while he was in a
domestic relationship with the alleged victim.” Id. at 5 n.3 (citation modified).

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We appointed counsel to represent Tiah and directed the parties to file
supplemental briefs addressing two issues: First, whether copies of the actual
protection orders at issue were required to determine whether Tiah was removable
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). Second, even assuming copies were not required,
whether the record was sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that,
as required by § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii): (a) the 2021 protection orders were issued against
Tiah for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts of domestic violence;
(b) a portion of the protection orders “involve[d] protection against credible threats
of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury”; and (c) a court determined that
Tiah engaged in conduct that violated that portion of the protection order. See Docket
for Tiah v. Bondi, 8th Cir. No. 24-2010 (May 20, 2025).
II. Discussion
In his supplemental brief, Tiah challenges the BIA’s conclusion that the
language in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02 was sufficient “to establish why the relevant
protection order was issued and which portion of it was violated.” Pet’r’s Suppl. Br.
10. Tiah maintains that 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii)’s plain language required DHS
to submit the actual protection order to prove why it was issued and whether he
violated a portion of that order. Alternatively, he argues that even if DHS was not
required to submit the actual protection order, the record evidence fails to show that
the protection order implicated § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).5
5 We conclude that the remaining issues that Tiah raised in his pro se brief are
without merit. First, Tiah’s assertion that removal proceedings should have been
terminated because the no-contact order was eventually dismissed and there was no
active order in place when he was “picked up” by authorities in May 2023 fails.
Nothing in § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) mandates that a noncitizen be subject to a valid no-
contact order at the time that he is brought into the custody of immigration
authorities or is served with an NTA. Moreover, there is no dispute that he was
convicted of violating a no-contact order on at least two occasions in 2021. Second,
we lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary decision to deny cancellation of
removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Mencia-Medina v. Garland, 90 F.4th
1229, 1233–34 (8th Cir. 2024) (declining to review factors agency considered in
determining noncitizen was “undeserving of relief as a matter of discretion”). Nor
did Tiah establish a due process violation. The proceedings were not fundamentally

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“Where, as here, the BIA issues a separate opinion, rather than summarily
affirming the IJ’s decision, we review the BIA’s decision as the final agency action.
To the extent the BIA adopted the IJ’s reasoning, as here, we review the IJ’s decision
too.” Hassan v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 587, 589 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation modified). We
apply de novo review to the BIA’s legal conclusions and review for substantial
evidence its factual findings. Id. “Substantial-evidence review is highly deferential,
and we will unsettle factual findings only if any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. (citation modified).
Tiah’s petition raises a statutory interpretation question not previously
considered by this court; i.e., what must the government show to establish
removability under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). In interpreting § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii), we
“adopt the ‘best reading of the statute’: the one ‘the court would have reached if no
agency were involved.’” 3M Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 154 F.4th 574, 577
(8th Cir. 2025) (quoting Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400 (2024)
(overruling Chevron-deference6 framework)). “The text is our guide.” Id. at 578.
Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) provides:
Any alien who at any time after admission is enjoined under a
protection order issued by a court and whom the court determines has
unfair, and in any event, Tiah’s assertion that the IJ did not obtain a knowing and
voluntary response regarding a waiver of his right to an attorney fails to articulate a
fundamental procedural error. See Alva-Arellano v. Lynch, 811 F.3d 1064, 1066 (8th
Cir. 2016) (de novo review; to establish due process violation, noncitizen must
demonstrate both fundamental error and prejudice); Ramirez v. Sessions, 902 F.3d
764, 772 (8th Cir. 2018) (to establish prejudice, noncitizen must show that “the
outcome of the proceeding may well have been different had there not been any
procedural irregularities” (citation modified)). We also note that Tiah filed a
counseled administrative brief before the BIA. Finally, there is no credible evidence
in the record to suggest that Tiah was prima facie eligible for a domestic violence
waiver under § 1227(a)(7).
6Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

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engaged in conduct that violates the portion of a protection order that
involves protection against credible threats of violence, repeated
harassment, or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the
protection order was issued is deportable. For purposes of this clause,
the term “protection order” means any injunction issued for the purpose
of preventing violent or threatening acts of domestic violence,[7]
including temporary or final orders issued by civil or criminal courts
(other than support or child custody orders or provisions) whether
obtained by filing an independent action or as a pendente lite order in
another proceeding.
The plain language of § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) sets forth “three elements” that the
government must prove “by clear and convincing evidence” “[f]or an alien to be
deportable under this provision.” Michel v. Att’y Gen. United States, No. 21-1649,
2022 WL 1421163, at *2 (3d Cir. May 5, 2022) (unpublished) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(3)(A)). Those elements are as follows:
(1) there must have been a protection order entered by a court against
the alien; (2) at least one portion of that order must have involved
protection against a credible threat of violence, repeated harassment, or
bodily injury; and (3) a court must have determined that the alien
engaged in conduct that violated that portion.
Id. (citation modified).
7 “Domestic violence” is defined as
[v]iolence between members of a household or between romantic or
sexual partners; the infliction of physical injury, or the creation of a
reasonable fear of such an infliction, against a member of a household
either by a parent or by a present or former member of the household. •
The term refers esp. to violence between spouses or sexual partners
(esp. cohabiting ones), but it can refer to other types of violence in a
domestic setting, such as intentional child abuse committed by a
member of the child’s family.
Violence, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

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We read § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) to require that an alien’s removability be
determined by the specific factual circumstances of the case and not on a categorical
basis. We agree with those circuits that have so held.8 “[T]he categorical and
modified categorical standards focus on the minimum conduct necessary to support
conviction or a generally applicable crime (or part of a divisible crime), without
regard to the actual conduct engaged in by a particular defendant.” Alvarez, 33 F.4th
at 640–41 (citation modified). These standards are inapplicable to
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii), which “places singular focus on the particular protection order
entered against an alien and that alien’s own conduct in violating the order.” Id. at
641. Determining an alien’s removability under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii)
necessarily calls for a circumstance-specific inquiry to determine both
whether the alien engaged in conduct that violated the protection order
under which he was enjoined and whether his conduct-based violation
pertained to a provision of that order involving protection against
credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury to a
particular person.
Id.
8See, e.g., Alvarez v. Garland, 33 F.4th 626, 640 (2d Cir. 2022) (“We construe
the quoted text unambiguously to signal Congress’s intent for removability under
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) to be determined on a circumstance-specific rather than a
categorical—or modified categorical—basis.”); Sunuwar 989 F.3d at 247–48
(stating that removability under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) ultimately turns on a finding as
to an alien’s “conduct”); Diaz-Quirazco v. Barr, 931 F.3d 830, 835 (9th Cir. 2019)
(upholding the BIA’s view “that the categorical approach does not apply to
determining” removability under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii)); Rodriguez v. Sessions, 876
F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 2017) (stating that “[w]hen a statute does not make itself
contingent on a conviction, the categorical approach is unnecessary, and courts
should respond to what the statute does depend on,” which, for purposes of
determining removability under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii), is simply “what a court
determines about the alien’s conduct” in his particular case (citation modified)).

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A. Necessity of Protection Order in the Administrative Record
This case is admittedly an outlier. Most cases have had the actual protection
order in the record when conducting a circumstance-specific inquiry under
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).9 But is inclusion of the actual protection order in the record
required to sustain a charge of removability under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii)? We conclude
that the answer is no. The relevant content of the protection order may be established
through other documentary evidence in the record.
The focus should be upon the whole record, not one specific document. “In
determining whether a noncitizen is removable under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii), the record
must permit the agency to conclude that” the requirements of § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii)
have been satisfied. Jules v. Garland, No. 23-6217-AG, 2024 WL 1252410, at *1
(2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2024) (unpublished summary order) (emphasis added). “Under the
agency’s own precedent, a state court must make the determination that [the alien]
violated the protection order.” Id. (citing Matter of Obshatko, 27 I. & N. Dec. 173,
176–77 (B.I.A. 2017)). Courts have considered evidence other than the protection
order itself in determining that the government satisfied its burden under
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).10
9See, e.g., Alvarez, 33 F.4th at 632 (2d Cir. 2022) (discussing contents of
order); Michel, 2022 WL 1421163, at *1 (unpublished opinion) (discussing
protection order); Sunuwar, 989 F.3d at 244 (noting protection order required
noncitizen to refrain from abusing, harassing, or contacting victim; discussing
contents of order on its face); Diaz-Quirazco, 931 F.3d at 835 (discussing petition
for restraining order and order granting petition); Rodriguez, 876 F.3d at 282
(discussing form order). But see Cespedes v. Lynch, 805 F.3d 1274, 1278 (10th Cir.
2015) (construing protection order based on authorizing statute); Garcia-Hernandez
v. Boente, 847 F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting record of conviction indicated
noncitizen was convicted of violating “stay away” portion of protection order).
10See, e.g., Garcia v. Wilkinson, 847 F. App’x 50, 53 (2d Cir. 2021)
(unpublished summary order) (considering “[t]he transcript of [the petitioner’s] plea
hearing in state court” in determining that the BIA did not err in finding the petitioner
removable under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii)); Garcia-Hernandez, 847 F.3d at 872–73
(concluding that the agency properly “looked at documents in the record of

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Tiah relies on Jules in support of his argument that § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) requires
submission of the protection order itself. To the contrary, Jules demonstrates that it
is the record evidence that a court examines to determine whether the government
has satisfied its burden of proof. There, a New York state court had issued an order
of protection against the petitioner prohibiting him from “communicating with,
intimidating, stalking, or harassing a former girlfriend.” Jules, 2024 WL 1252410,
at *1. The petitioner was subsequently charged with offenses “for allegedly entering
his ex-girlfriend’s house in violation of the protection order.” Id. He ultimately
pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal contempt, in violation of New York Penal
Law (NYPL) § 215.50. Id. The certificate of conviction, however, failed to “identify
the subsection of NYPL § 215.50 to which [the petitioner] pleaded guilty”; this
certificate of conviction was “the only state court document in the record.” Id. The
petitioner challenged the agency’s finding of removability under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii),
arguing that “his plea to second-degree criminal contempt did not require the state
court to find that he had violated the protection order entered against him.” Id.
The Second Circuit held that the government failed to carry its burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner was removable because
it produced no evidence that “a court had determined that [the petitioner] violated a
relevant portion of the protection order,” as required by § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). Id. at
*2. In sustaining the charge of removability, “[t]he agency mentione[d] only that
[the petitioner’s] conviction was ‘premised on’ his violation of the protection order.”
Id. Although “[t]he IJ reviewed the felony complaint, supporting deposition,
domestic incident report and arrest report in finding [the petitioner] removable,” id.
(citation modified), neither these “prosecution documents” nor the conviction
established by clear and convincing evidence that “a court determined that [the
petitioner] ‘engaged in conduct that violate[d] the portion of a protection order that
involves protection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or
bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the protection order was issued,’”
conviction to determine the portions of the protection order that [the petitioner] was
charged with and convicted of violating”).

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id. (second alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii)). In fact, the
record showed that a “first-degree criminal contempt charge was withdrawn because
the prosecution determined that it could not prove that [the petitioner] intended to
harass, annoy, threaten or alarm the person for whose protection the order was
issued.” Id. (citation modified). There was no record evidence “about why the
prosecution could not prove the initial charge or what crimes the state court
concluded that [the petitioner] had actually committed.” Id. In summary, the issue
in Jules was not whether the actual protection order was required to sustain the
charge but instead whether the government produced sufficient evidence to satisfy
the requirements of § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).
Accordingly, we hold that the actual protection order is not required to sustain
a charge of removability under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). Instead, the question is whether
the record establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that the requirements of
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) are satisfied to sustain the charge of removability.
B. Clear and Convincing Evidence
Because the actual protection order is not required to sustain a charge of
removability under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii), we next examine whether the government
proved by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the 2021 protection orders were
issued against Tiah for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts of
domestic violence; (2) a portion of the protection orders “involve[d] protection
against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury,” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii); and (3) a court determined that Tiah engaged in conduct that
violated that portion of the protection order. See Michel, 2022 WL 1421163, at *2.
We conclude that the text of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02, in conjunction with the state-
court docket reports, informations, police reports, and Tiah’s own testimony
satisfied the government’s burden.
First, the evidence shows that the North Dakota state court issued the 2021
protection orders against Tiah to prevent violent or threatening acts of domestic
violence. The state-court docket reports show that the pre-disposition protection

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order was issued against Tiah on January 20, 2021, and that the post-disposition
protection order was issued against him on June 4, 2021. A.R. 493. Tiah’s testimony
establishes that the protection orders were no-contact orders concerning “domestic
violence.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). Tiah admitted to the IJ that his wife Rose
had obtained these no-contact orders against him. A.R. 255–57, 305, 306. The
information filed in Case No. 09-2021-cr-00389 provides that the no-contact order
prohibited Tiah from “c[o]m[ing] within 300 yards of Rose Tiah.” Id. at 508. Tiah
admitted that the January 20 protection order arose from his wife Rose telling police
that he “terrorize[d] her, . . . wanted to fight her, [and] . . . pick[ed] [sic] a knife for
her.” Id. at 300. The docket report shows that Tiah ultimately pleaded guilty to
disorderly conduct, A.R. 493, which criminalizes “engag[ing] in fighting, or in
violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior.” N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31-01(1)(a).
The state court issued the protection orders against Tiah pursuant to N.D.C.C.
§ 12.1-31.2-02, titled “Order prohibiting contact.” That provision provides that a
person “charged with [or] arrested for . . . a crime of violence or threat of violence,
stalking, harassment, or a sex offense” may be subject to “an order prohibiting the
individual from having contact with the victim.” N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02(1)(a).11
The purpose of a protection order issued under this section is to prohibit an
individual accused of a crime of violence from committing further crimes against
the victim by prohibiting contact with that victim. Cf. State v. Thesing, 14 N.W.3d
574, 577 (N.D. 2024) (“The wording of the statute is unambiguous and allows a
district court to issue a no contact order if an individual charged with a crime of
violence and the court is considering whether the individual will be released from
custody before arraignment or trial.”). “Given the underlying facts, . . . there can be
11 The BIA was incorrect in stating that because the protection order against
Tiah was issued under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02, the government established Tiah’s
removability under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). This is because N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02
does not limit protection orders to “domestic violence.” By contrast,
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) provides that “the term ‘protection order’ means any injunction
issued for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts of domestic
violence.”

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no question that the 20[21] order[s] w[ere] entered ‘for the purpose of preventing
violent or threatening acts of domestic violence.’” Alvarez, 33 F.4th at 646–47
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii)).
Second, although the actual protection orders are not in the record, the
evidence establishes that a portion of the protection orders “involve[d] protection
against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). “[T]he no-contact provisions of a protection order inherently
involve ‘protection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or
bodily injury,’ and therefore fall under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).” Sunuwar, 989 F.3d at
248. Here, the evidence, as discussed supra, shows that the protection orders issued
against Tiah were no-contact orders prohibiting him from coming within 300 yards
of his wife Tiah. This element is sufficiently proven.
Finally, the evidence establishes that a court determined that Tiah engaged in
conduct that violated the protection orders on two occasions.
To satisfy this element, there is no requirement that the alien actually
engage in violent conduct. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the
alien’s conduct violated the portion of the [protection order] designed
to prevent violent conduct. Indeed, even an alien’s benign conduct may
violate the portion of a protection order designed to prevent violent
conduct.
In considering the third element, an agency may consider all
probative and reliable evidence regarding what the court has
determined about the alien’s violation of the protection order. Such
evidence may fairly include the criminal complaint, affidavit of
probable cause, and other documents in the record of conviction.
Michel, 2022 WL 1421163, at *3 (citation modified).
Here, the docket reports show that Tiah was twice charged with “Violation of
an order prohibiting contact,” in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-02(4). A.R. 495,

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499. The information filed in Case No. 09-2021-cr-00389 charged that Tiah
“willfully violated a court order prohibiting contact” by “c[o]m[ing] within 300
yards of Rose Tiah in violation of an order prohibiting contact.” Id. at 508. The
information in Case No. 09-2021-cr-01187 made a similar allegation. Id. at 516
(“The defendant willfully violated a court order prohibiting contact . . . regarding
Rose Tiah . . . .”). Police reports detailed the conduct underlying both charges. See
id. at 509, 517. The police report in Case No. 09-2021-cr-00389 stated that Tiah
violated the no-contact order by “being in the home with the protected party, Rose
Tiah, on the date of 1/25/2021, when he was located by officers.” Id. at 509. The
police report in Case No. 09-2021-cr-01187 stated that Tiah violated the no-contact
order by “contacting Rose,” which he “admitted to” doing. Id. at 517. Before the IJ,
Tiah conceded that he had been in contact with his wife Rose despite the court’s
order prohibiting such contact. Id. at 301. The docket reports show that on May 21,
2021, Tiah pleaded guilty before the state court to both charges of violating the no-
contact order. Id. at 442, 495. The state court entered criminal judgments in both
cases, as reflected on the state-court docket reports. Thus, by accepting Tiah’s guilty
plea and entering judgment, the state court determined that Tiah engaged in conduct
that violated the no-contact protection order.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.
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