United States of America v. Joshua E. Riley

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-3262
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Joshua E. Riley
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
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Submitted: February 9, 2026
Filed: June 11, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before LOKEN, SMITH, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Joshua Riley pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement to
cyberstalking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2). The statutory maximum for
Riley’s sentence was 60 months’ imprisonment, and his Guidelines range was 30 to
37 months’ imprisonment. During sentencing, Riley requested a below-Guidelines
sentence of 13 months’ imprisonment, arguing, among other things, that “his mental

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health issues . . . mitigate[d] the nature of the threats that occurred in this case.” R.
Doc. 39, at 12. The government advocated for a sentence at the top of the Guidelines
range. It agreed that Riley “does have a mental health issue” and argued that Riley
had been planning a “mass shooting,” which law enforcement had averted. Id. at 14.
The district court1 determined that the statutory maximum sentence was necessary
“to protect the public . . . given the significant potential of multiple . . . shootings
and killings by [Riley]” and to deter Riley from dangerous conduct. Id. at 18. The
court gave Riley credit for 17 months that he previously spent in state custody,
resulting in a 43-month sentence.
The district court noted that although Riley might consider the sentence
“unduly long,” it considered the sentence “beneficial to [Riley] in at least two ways.”
Id. at 19. First, the district court believed that the state court presiding over Riley’s
state charge for attempted assault based on the same circumstances that led to his
federal charge would consider the “long [federal] sentence” and impose a shorter
state sentence. Id. Second, the district court expressed “hope” that its
recommendation for “a mental health re-evaluation and treatment . . . in the federal
system” would be “helpful” to Riley and “be a difference between a useful and
helpful future life after release from imprisonment.” Id. In the court’s words, it hoped
that “this significant sentence for the future may turn out very helpful for [Riley].”
Id. at 20. But the court reiterated that it was imposing the upward variance “[l]argely
for deterrence purposes but also for purposes of dealing with the seriousness of the
offense, the actions that have occurred.” Id. The court stated that it would
recommend a mental health evaluation and treatment.
Riley objected that it was “inappropriate to base incarceration on treatment
because prison is not—that’s not a permissible factor for the [c]ourt to consider.” Id.
at 23. The district court responded, “All right. I did—I did, of course, mention
1 The Honorable Howard F. Sachs, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

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treatment but, simply, part of my comment that hopefully the—hopefully that
treatment may be helpful to [Riley].” Id.
Riley appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court imposed or
lengthened his sentence to promote his rehabilitation, in violation of Tapia v. United
States, 564 U.S. 319, 327 (2011) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) prohibits
sentencing courts from imposing or lengthening a term of imprisonment to promote
a defendant’s rehabilitation). We disagree. The record shows that the district court
did not impose the upward variance “for the purpose of ‘promoting correction and
rehabilitation’” but instead to protect the public, deter Riley from dangerous
conduct, and because of the seriousness of the offense. United States v. Moore, No.
23-2125, 2023 WL 7297168, at *1 (8th Cir. Nov. 6, 2023) (unpublished per curiam)
(quoting Tapia, 564 U.S. at 327). The district court did not address the topic of
Riley’s mental health treatment until after it had already explained that an upward
variance was necessary to protect the public and deter Riley from dangerous
conduct. Id. (“The district court also considered the relevant sentencing factors of
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the pertinent policy statements in the Guidelines.”). After
selecting the 43-month sentence, the court noted that Riley “may consider that this
is an unduly long sentence” and discussed two reasons that the sentence could benefit
Riley. R. Doc. 39, at 19. One of those reasons was the district court’s hope that Riley
could receive mental health treatment while in prison. The court followed this
statement by reiterating that the upward variance was based on deterrence and the
seriousness of the offense. See Moore, 2023 WL 7297168, at *1. We also note that
Riley had asked the court to consider his mental health issues in crafting a sentence
and submitted a psychological evaluation for the court’s consideration.
“If there was any doubt as to the propriety of the district court’s reason for
imposing its sentence, the district court clarified itself later in the hearing after
[Riley’s] counsel objected.” Id. at *2. The court clarified that while it had mentioned
mental health treatment, it did so to express its “hope[] that treatment may be helpful
to [Riley].” R. Doc. 39, at 23.

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Finding no Tapia error, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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