United States of America v. Phillip Lamount Davis

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1483
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Phillip Lamount Davis
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
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Submitted: April 13, 2026
Filed: June 23, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Phillip Lamount Davis pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute a
controlled substance, one count of distribution of a controlled substance while on
pretrial release, and one count of possession with intent to distribute a controlled
substance while on pretrial release. At his sentencing hearing, the district court
applied a two-level enhancement for Davis’s leadership role in the conspiracy and

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sentenced him to 150 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release. Davis
appeals, arguing that the district court erred in applying this enhancement. Having
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse and remand.
Davis’s conviction arises from drug trafficking activities he undertook while
on federal pretrial release in a different drug trafficking case. In June 2024,
Minnesota Lake Superior Violent Offender Task Force law enforcement officers
(LEOs) learned that Davis was selling methamphetamine and fentanyl from his
apartment in Hibbing, Minnesota, notwithstanding the fact that he was currently
under federal pretrial release supervision. In late June 2024, LEOs facilitated a
controlled buy in which a confidential informant purchased 29.2 grams of
methamphetamine from Davis.
Less than two weeks later, LEOs learned that Davis had directed Misty Kay
Lind and another female to go to Minneapolis-St. Paul (MSP) to pick up drugs.
LEOs identified Lind’s vehicle on the highway heading back from MSP and stopped
it. Lind was in the driver’s seat, and an unidentified female was in the passenger’s
seat. LEOs searched Lind’s vehicle and found 158.2 grams of methamphetamine
and fentanyl. Lind told LEOs that Davis had given her $1,500 with instructions to
pick up methamphetamine for him from someone in MSP. She also told them that
she had made two prior trips to purchase drugs for Davis.
That same day, LEOs arrested Davis as he left his apartment. While detained,
Davis dropped several items, including a pocketknife and paper towel—both of
which contained cocaine residue—and a digital scale. LEOs subsequently executed
a search warrant at Davis’s apartment. They found 51.6 grams of fentanyl, 32 grams
of methamphetamine, an airsoft pistol with a black painted tip, and $1,295 in cash.
When LEOs later met with Davis while he was in custody at the city jail, Davis
repeatedly denied that he sold drugs and told them that he did nothing wrong.
Subsequently, a federal grand jury charged Davis in a three-count indictment
with conspiracy to distribute fentanyl; distribution of methamphetamine while on

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pretrial release; and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and
methamphetamine while on pretrial release. Davis pled guilty to all three counts,
and the district court ordered the United States’ Probation Office to prepare a
presentence investigation report (PSR).
The PSR grouped Davis’s three convictions pursuant to United States
Sentencing Guideline (USSG) § 2D1.1 and calculated his base offense level as 26.
The PSR recommended a two-level enhancement for Davis’s role as an organizer,
leader, manager, or supervisor of the crime pursuant to USSG § 3B1.1(c), a
three-level obstruction of justice enhancement for committing these offenses while
on supervised release, and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
Applying these enhancements and reduction, Davis’s total offense level became 28,
and, with a criminal history category of VI, his Guideline range was 140 to 175
months’ imprisonment. The district court applied the PSR’s recommended
enhancements and reduction and sentenced Davis to 150 months’
imprisonment—120 months to be served concurrently with the undischarged term
of imprisonment imposed in his previous federal case and 30 months to be served
consecutively to that.
Davis argues that the district court erred in applying the leadership
enhancement under USSG § 3B1.1(c), contending that the Government failed to
prove that the enhancement applied to Davis’s conduct by a preponderance of the
evidence. We review the district court’s factual findings as to whether a leadership
enhancement is proper for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United
States v. Keleta, 949 F.3d 1082, 1093 (8th Cir. 2020). “It is the government’s burden
to prove a leadership enhancement applies by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
(citation omitted).
USSG § 3B1.1(c) provides that if a defendant was an organizer, leader,
manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity, his offense level should be increased
by two levels. “We ‘broadly construe’ the definition of an organizer, leader,
manager, or supervisor.” United States v. Alexander, 714 F.3d 1085, 1091 (8th Cir.

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2013) (citation omitted). At the time of Davis’s sentencing, the commentary to
USSG § 3B1.1 provided that even if a defendant did not manage or supervise other
participants, he could receive an upward departure if he “exercised management
responsibility over the property, assets, or activities of a criminal organization.”
USSG § 3B1.1, cmt. n.2 (2024). In November 2025, the Commission removed this
language from the commentary. See Amend. 836 to USSG § 3B1.1.
The PSR explained that it applied the leadership enhancement to Davis
because he “operated in a higher position in the conspiracy, exerted decision-making
authority, and utilized Lind and others to traffic drugs from MSP to his apartment.”
Davis objected to the enhancement’s application and its factual predicates in his
written objections to the PSR. He argued that “[t]his was a very low-level, two-
person drug distribution agreement with his romantic partner” and that he “did not
‘use or control’ any other person, and the ‘scope’ of the conspiracy was limited to
small, local sales of common street drugs.” He repeated these objections at
sentencing. The Government did not call a witness to prove the disputed facts, but
it nonetheless urged the district court to apply the enhancement based on the
undisputed record. The district court agreed with the Government, concluding that
the undisputed facts “establish that Mr. Davis exercised management responsibility
over the property, asserts, or activities of the charged conspiracy,” and it accordingly
applied the leadership enhancement.
Davis argues that the district court erroneously interpreted the commentary to
USSG § 3B1.1(c) in its application of this enhancement. We agree. Indeed, the
application notes to USSG § 3B1.1(c) instruct that “[t]o qualify for an adjustment
under this section, the defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or
supervisor of one or more other participants.” USSG § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2 (emphasis
added); see also United States v. Hammerschmidt, 881 F.3d 633, 637 (8th Cir. 2018)
(explaining that this application note resolved a circuit split and “clarified that
a § 3B1.1 adjustment was appropriate only if the defendant had organized, led,
managed, or supervised another participant”). Although at the time of Davis’s
sentencing, the application notes provided that a defendant could receive an upward

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departure if he “exercised management responsibility over property, assets, or
activities of a criminal organization,” USSG § 3B1.1, cmt. n.2 (2024) (emphasis
added), sentencing enhancements are distinct from upward departures, see Drew v.
United States, 46 F.3d 823, 826 (8th Cir. 1995) (“This Court has recognized that the
extent of an upward departure is ‘quintessentially a judgment call’ by the district
court.” (citation omitted)).
For the district court to apply the § 3B1.1(c) enhancement, the Government
must prove that Davis organized, led, managed, or supervised another participant in
the drug conspiracy. See Hammerschmidt, 881 F.3d at 637. And the district court
must make a corresponding factual finding. Because it did not do so, we remand for
further proceedings. Id. at 638; see also United States v. Musa, 830 F.3d 786, 788-
89 (8th Cir. 2016) (remanding a case where the district court failed to make the
required finding that the defendant organized or led another participant in the
criminal scheme to justify the § 3B1.1 enhancement). The record may be reopened
for the district court to hear any relevant evidence on this issue. See United States
v. Eason, 907 F.3d 554, 557 (8th Cir. 2018).
For the foregoing reasons, we remand the case to provide the district court the
opportunity to clarify whether Davis organized, led, managed, or supervised at least
one other participant, and to identify what evidence supports that finding.
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