Triston James Rhodes v. Fulton Thermal Corp.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1849
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Triston James Rhodes
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
Fulton Thermal Corp.
Defendant - Appellee
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No. 25-1881
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Triston James Rhodes
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Fulton Thermal Corp.
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas - Texarkana
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Submitted: April 16, 2026
Filed: June 12, 2026
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Before SMITH, BENTON, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
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BENTON, Circuit Judge.
Triston J. Rhodes was injured while inspecting a “thermal fluid heater” (a
boiler) manufactured and inspected by Fulton Thermal Corp. Alleging defects in
design, manufacturing, and marketing, he sued Fulton for negligence and strict
products liability. The district court1 granted summary judgment to Fulton. Rhodes
appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
I.
Rhodes worked at a Tyson Foods plant in Nashville, Arkansas. On July 9, he
and his supervisor, Jeremy Hamner, began a monthly inspection of a boiler, which
Fulton had manufactured 21 years before.
Checking the low gas-pressure switch on the boiler, Hamner turned off the
natural-gas supply and restarted the boiler. Rhodes watched close by. Testing the
high gas-pressure switch, Rhodes and Hamner saw a “cloud of white stuff” and heard
a “mechanical sound.” The boiler exploded. Both men suffered severe burns.
Three weeks later, Fulton and Tyson inspected the fire scene but did not test
the boiler. It was removed within three weeks after the accident. Rhodes was not
notified of the inspection or the removal.
The boiler supplied natural gas to a burner on it. The burner sent fire down
into the center of the boiler. The burner heated circular coils of tubing and the
thermal fluid (“paratherm”) within them. After reaching 550 degrees, the paratherm
1 The Honorable Susan O. Hickey, United States District Judge for the Western
District of Arkansas.

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left the boiler and was pumped from the boiler through the plant to cookers, which
fried pieces of chicken.
Fulton employees inspected the boiler quarterly—including three days before
the explosion. These inspections tested the pumping system, pressure gauges, and
safety components; reviewed prior inspection reports; and checked for smoke
emissions from the boiler.
In addition to the quarterly inspections, Fulton inspected the boiler annually
for two days. The latest annual inspection, three months before the explosion,
included a physical examination of the internal components. Entering the boiler,
Fulton employees visually inspected about 25 percent of the interior coils, checking
for signs of paratherm leakage. None of Fulton’s inspections reported issues.
During discovery, Rhodes’s expert, David Caggiano, testified that the annual
inspection should have included radiographic testing.2 He theorized that paratherm
leaking from the boiler’s coils ignited when Hamner restarted the boiler, causing the
explosion. He stated that a malfunction in the internal coils occurred “pretty soon
before the fire,” and likely left physical evidence of a paratherm leak. He
acknowledged there were “dozens” of possible ignition sources outside the boiler
but concluded that his theory “matches the fact pattern best.” Asked about coil
malfunction, he said that coil perforation could have been caused by “thermal
expansion and contraction,” “weld failure,” or “anything, really.” Asked about a
manufacturing defect, he stated: “I’m not saying there’s a manufacturing defect,
though.” Asked if the boiler had a design defect, he answered “No.”
Justin Harrington, a Fulton service technician, testified that during his 18
years of inspecting boilers, he witnessed (only) one coil perforation, at a different
2 Explained as “a non-destructive testing method using x-ray technology to
identify flaws such as cracks, inclusions and other irregularities within metal
components.”

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plant. He concluded that the malfunction was caused by an improper balance of the
system, which led to “a bunch of smoke coming out of our stack.”
Granting summary judgment, the district court found no evidence that Fulton
breached a duty, supplied a defective boiler, or proximately caused Rhodes’s
injuries. He appeals.
II.
Rhodes argues the district court erred by granting summary judgment due to
genuine disputes of material fact whether Fulton supplied a defective boiler and
negligently inspected and serviced it. Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,
the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). “The movant ‘bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,’ and must
identify ‘those portions of [the record] . . . which it believes demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.’” Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031,
1042 (8th Cir. 2011), citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “If
the movant does so, the nonmovant must respond by submitting evidentiary
materials that set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmovant “must do more than simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” by “com[ing]
forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87
(1986), citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). “Where the record taken as a whole could not
lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue
for trial.” Id. at 587. (internal quotation marks omitted).

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A.
To recover under a theory of strict products liability, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) the supplier is engaged in the business of manufacturing, assembling, selling,
leasing or otherwise distributing a product; (2) it was supplied by him in a defective
condition which rendered it unreasonably dangerous; and (3) the defective condition
was a proximate cause of the harm to person or property. See S. Co. v. Graham,
607 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Ark. 1980); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-116-101(a) (same).
“It is not necessary to establish these elements by direct proof; circumstantial
evidence will suffice.” Yielding v. Chrysler Motor Co., 783 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Ark.
1990). Without direct proof, a plaintiff must offer substantial evidence that “negates
other possible causes of failure of the product, not attributable to the defendant, and
thus creates a reasonable inference that the defendant is responsible for the defect.”
Higgins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 699 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Ark. 1985). “Substantial
evidence must be of sufficient force and character to compel a conclusion one way
or another; it must force or induce the mind to pass beyond suspicion or conjecture.”
Yielding, 783 S.W.2d at 355. “Conjecture and speculation, however plausible,
cannot be permitted to supply the place of proof.” Glidewell v. Arkhola Sand &
Gravel Co., 208 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Ark. 1948).
Rhodes argues that, absent a defect, the boiler would not have exploded. See
Crawford v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 295 F.3d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen
common experience teaches that an accident would not have happened in the
absence of a defect, a case may sometimes be allowed to proceed to a factfinder.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Case Corp., 878
S.W.2d 741, 744 (Ark. 1994), citing Williams v. Smart Chevrolet Co., 730 S.W.2d
479 (Ark. 1987) (explaining that the mere occurrence of an accident does not
establish a product defect, but that additional facts tending to show the defect existed
before the accident may establish a sufficient case). Rhodes believes that Caggiano
and Harrington negate alternative causes of the accident and that, as supported by
eyewitness testimony, a defect caused the explosion.

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Rhodes’s argument fails. His expert Caggiano acknowledged that “dozens”
of ignition sources existed outside the boiler; conceded he did not know how the
coils malfunctioned; and could not identify a manufacturing or a design defect. His
testimony does not sufficiently negate other possible causes of failure and thus create
a reasonable inference of a defect.3 See Bohannon v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 279
S.W.3d 502, 508 (Ark. 2008) (“[T]he opinion of an expert will be considered to be
substantial evidence unless it clearly appears that the expert’s opinion is opposed to
physical facts or to common knowledge or to the dictates of common sense, or is
pure speculation.”). Also not negating other possible causes are: (1) employee
Harrington’s confirmation of a single coil malfunction elsewhere, or (2) Rhodes and
Hamner’s belief that the explosion originated in the boiler.
Rhodes’s explanation for the explosion is insufficient to create a genuine
dispute of material fact. See Kapp v. Bob Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 353 S.W.2d 5, 17
(Ark. 1962) (holding that where plaintiff offered several possible causes of seatbelt
failure, the case rested on “conjecture and speculation” and that the causes were only
possibilities, not probabilities); Mixon v. Chrysler Corp., 663 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Ark.
1984) (“The possibility that the product may have been defective is not enough. The
proponent of a products liability claim must produce evidence from which the trier
of fact may reasonably conclude that it is more probable than not that the injury
resulted from a defective product.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment to Rhodes on the strict
products liability claim.
3 This court thus need not address Rhodes’s passing references to Fulton’s
failure to preserve fire scene evidence, especially the boiler, in light of National Fire
Protection Association standards.

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B.
According to the Supreme Court of Arkansas: “negligence is the failure to do
something that a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something that
a reasonably careful person would not do.” Schubert v. Target Stores, Inc., 369
S.W.3d 717, 719 (Ark. 2010). “Under Arkansas law, in order to prevail on a claim
of negligence, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff,
that the defendant breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injuries.” Yanmar Co. v. Slater, 386 S.W.3d 439, 449 (Ark. 2012).
“The burden in a negligence case is always on the party asserting the claim;
negligence is never assumed.” Id. It “may be established by direct or circumstantial
evidence, but a plaintiff may not rely on inferences based on conjecture or
speculation.” Robinson Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC v. Phillips, 519 S.W.3d 291,
302 (Ark. 2017). “[T]he mere fact that an accident occurred is not evidence of
negligence.” Schubert, 369 S.W.3d at 719.
Rhodes argues that Fulton’s inspections of the 21-year-old internal coils were
inadequate, because technicians entering the boiler would examine (at most) 25
percent of the boiler’s tubing. He contends that the white cloud before the explosion
was consistent with a coil perforation that leaked Paratherm, which Harrington
admitted had occurred once before. He believes that Caggiano’s testimony shows
that Fulton should have required radiographic inspections, covering not-examined
inner tubes, outer tubes, the heat exchanger, and coke buildup.
Even if Rhodes proved a duty and a breach, he failed to present evidence of
proximate causation. Rhodes ignores his expert’s admissions: (1) no evidence
showed any perforation before July 8, 2020—the day before the explosion; and (2)
if the fire had been caused by a malfunctioning internal coil, it would have occurred
“pretty soon before the fire,” and likely would have produced physical evidence of
a leak. It is undisputed that Fulton regularly inspected the boilers—including three
days before the incident—and identified no issues. Proximate causation cannot be
established where Rhodes cannot prove that there was any detectable perforation

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when Fulton inspected the boiler. See Neal v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr., 422 S.W.3d
116, 121 (Ark. 2012) (“Although proximate causation is usually a question of fact
for a jury, where reasonable minds cannot differ, a question of law is presented for
determination by the court. When a party cannot present proof on an essential
element of his claim, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter
of law.”) (cleaned up); Nationwide Rentals Co. v. Carter, 765 S.W.2d 931, 935–36
(Ark. 1989) (same).
The district court properly granted summary judgment to Rhodes on the
negligence claim.4
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The judgment is affirmed.
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4 This court thus need not address Fulton’s cross-appeal.

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