United States of America v. Antonio Copeland

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1370
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United States of America,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,
v.
Antonio Copeland,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids
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Submitted: March 16, 2026
Filed: July 14, 2026
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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COLLOTON, Chief Judge.
Antonio Copeland pleaded guilty to distribution and possession with intent to
distribute methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)-(B). The district

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court* sentenced Copeland to 292 months’ imprisonment, the low end of the advisory
sentencing guideline range. Copeland appeals his sentence, and argues for the first
time on appeal that the district court impermissibly applied a presumption that the
advisory guideline range was reasonable. We conclude that there is no plain error
warranting relief, and affirm the judgment.
Copeland did not object in the district court to the alleged use of a presumption,
so we review his claim for plain error. United States v. Alvizo-Trujillo, 521 F.3d
1015, 1018 (8th Cir. 2008). To obtain relief, he must show an obvious error that
affected his substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-35
(1993).
It is settled that a district court “may not presume that the Guidelines range is
reasonable,” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007), so it would be plain error
for a district court to do so. On this record, however, Copeland has failed to show
that the district court plainly erred.
Copeland cites two portions of the sentencing transcript in support of his
argument. First, he points to a colloquy regarding his motion for a downward
variance from the advisory guidelines. Copeland sought a lower sentence based on
a policy disagreement with the sentencing range for “ice methamphetamine,”—that
is, methamphetamine “of at least 80% purity.” See USSG § 2D1.1(c), n.(C). In
response, the court stated that it had no policy disagreement with a sentencing
discrepancy between pure methamphetamine and a methamphetamine mixture. The
*The Honorable C.J. Williams, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the
Northern District of Iowa.
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court volunteered, however, that “[i]f I was drafting the guidelines, I wouldn’t have
it at the rate that it is.”
Second, after the court pronounced sentence, the government inquired whether
the court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the sentencing
guidelines. The court stated that it might sentence Copeland differently “if the
guidelines are amended and applied retroactively.” The court explained it did not
“want to foreclose the possibility of the defendant receiving a benefit, if that is
deemed to be appropriate and Congress approves it.”
Copeland argues that the court’s statements show that the judge applied a
presumption of reasonableness to the advisory guidelines and failed to make an
individualized assessment of his case based on the facts presented. The court’s
remarks, however, do not establish an obvious error. Although the sentencing
guidelines are advisory, and there is no legal presumption that the guideline sentence
should apply, the advisory guideline range is a factor that the district court must
consider at sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). A court may vary from the
guidelines based on a policy disagreement with the Sentencing Commission, but the
court is not required to do so. United States v. Noriega, 35 F.4th 643, 652 (8th Cir.
2022). Even where a judge volunteers that he would draft the guidelines differently,
the judge also must consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). And the judge may consider that the Sentencing
Commission reaches decisions on promulgating and amending guidelines after a
deliberative process among a diverse group of seven voting commissioners, informed
by comments and data that come to its attention. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(a), 994(o).
In sum, there are reasons other than an impermissible presumption of
reasonableness that a district court may choose to impose a sentence within an
advisory range despite expressing a policy disagreement with a sentencing guideline.
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So too may a district court properly reserve judgment on how it would sentence in
light of a retroactive guideline amendment without applying an impermissible
presumption of reasonableness. If the Commission were to amend a guideline in light
of comments and data, then a district court properly could consider the Commission’s
action and rationale, while still making the required individualized assessment of a
particular defendant’s case.
Copeland did not object in the district court based on an alleged impermissible
presumption, so the judge had no occasion to address the matter. The district court
did expressly state that it had considered all of the factors under § 3553(a), and
specifically discussed Copeland’s offense conduct, history, and characteristics. That
procedure is consistent with an individualized assessment. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-
50. As the record stands, Copeland has failed to show a plain error warranting relief.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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