United States of America v. Richard Stone

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1488
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Richard Stone
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas - Fayetteville
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Submitted: April 13, 2026
Filed: July 30, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Richard Stone pled guilty to one count of operating an unlicensed money
transmitting business, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a). The district court1
sentenced him to 51 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release. Stone
1 The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas.

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now appeals, arguing that the district court erred in applying a two-level
enhancement for receiving funds that he knew or believed were proceeds of unlawful
activity pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) § 2S1.3(b)(1)(A);
he also contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Having jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I.
Stone was an Arkansas resident and the president of numerous businesses
headquartered in Arkansas. Although Stone’s businesses purported to develop
technology and facilities that could repurpose waste materials into fuel, none of these
businesses actually financed any energy projects. Additionally, none of the
businesses were registered in Arkansas as money transmitting businesses. This
meant they could not be used to “transfer[] funds on behalf of the public by any and
all means including but not limited to . . . wire, check, draft, facsimile, or courier.”
18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(2).
Prior to December 2024, investigators discovered 13 federal loan applications
from 2020 to 2021 that were fraudulently tied to Stone’s personal and business bank
accounts. These applications were for Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans,
which were designed to help businesses keep their workers employed during the
Covid-19 pandemic, and Economic Impact Disaster Loans (EIDL), which were
offered to small businesses during the pandemic. The applications for these loans
used the identities of individuals who did not know Stone and were unaware that
loan applications were being made on their behalf. Many of these loan applications
also used forged personal identification documents, with the supposed loan
“borrowers” directing that the proceeds be deposited into Stone’s accounts. The
EIDL and PPP loans Stone obtained totaled to $608,782. After Stone received the
money, he would wire-transfer most of the funds to parties based in New York,
England, Switzerland, and India, while retaining 30% of the amount as payment for
his remittances and transfers. Stone’s accounts receiving the loans had no other
legitimate income aside from Social Security payments.

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Investigators also discovered that Stone used forged or fraudulent checks to
deposit funds into his accounts, that he had obtained funds under the Pandemic
Unemployment Assistance (PUA) program with applications using the identities of
others, and that a company named Hosack Partners IV LLC deposited money into
one of his accounts after receiving a phishing email. The loss from these transactions
totaled $574,172.10. Including the funds distributed to Stone via EIDL and PPP
loans, the total loss amounted to $1,192,954.10.
When investigators asked Stone what he knew about the funds deposited into
his accounts, he claimed that he believed they were merely investments or loans
from outside investors into his businesses, and that some of these investors wanted
him to transfer funds on their behalf to other accounts. However, Stone then
admitted that he did not have any documentation for these supposed “loans” from
investors. And he claimed that he believed the PPP funds deposited into his accounts
were loans coming from “Private Public Partnership[s]” with investors.
Stone was charged via information with knowingly conducting, controlling,
managing, supervising, directing, or owning all or part of an unlicensed money
transmitting business, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a). Stone pled guilty to this
count pursuant to a plea agreement, and afterwards the United States Probation
Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) that calculated a total
offense level of 17 and an advisory imprisonment range of 24 to 30 months. The
PSR’s calculation included a two-level enhancement under USSG § 2S1.3(b)(1)(A),
which applies when a defendant knows or believes that the funds associated with a
crime are proceeds of unlawful activity.
At sentencing, Stone objected to the PSR’s application of the § 2S1.3(b)(1)(A)
enhancement. He argued that the government did not have any direct evidence that
he knew the funds came from unlawful activity and that he honestly believed the
funds were from legitimate investors. The district court overruled Stone’s objection
and applied the enhancement. It stated that “the fact that the government has no
direct evidence of what was inside Mr. Stone’s head during . . . these transactions is

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not particularly surprising or helpful,” instead noting that the context of the case and
Stone’s actions were more significant. The district court then pointed to numerous
facts indicating that Stone knew about the illegality of the funds, including that Stone
“was apparently the president or chief executive officer of numerous
[energy-related] businesses. . . . [despite] there [being] no evidence that energy
projects were ongoing or being financed”; that “shortly after the deposits would be
placed into Stone’s [bank] account[s] . . . Stone would quickly move the funds to
unknown people, [whom] he calls . . . investors, or to other accounts that Stone
controlled”; that Stone “attempted to deposit checks that were forged or fraudulent
into three . . . additional banks and accounts”; and that Stone’s businesses were
“‘corporate shells’ because [they] did not appear to have any employees, . . . any
assets, . . . [or] any operations.” The district court then found that Stone’s version
of the events was not reasonable, giving the following explanation:
[Stone’s objection relies on] . . . three sets of unknown people[:] the
unknown online people, the unknown foreign investors, and the
unknown people whose names appear on the remittances for the
government loan proceeds that [we]re wired into his accounts . . . [from
which] the funds were immediately wired out . . . [to] unknown
investors in multiple different foreign companies. And despite that
background, [Stone] says that, at all times, he thought that all of this
was legitimate.
Ultimately concluding that it “simply d[id] not find Mr. Stone’s . . . objection to be
credible,” the district court instead said that it “believe[d] that Mr. Stone was a cog
in a larger network of fraudsters.”
After the district court rejected Stone’s objection to the enhancement, it
determined that an above-Guidelines-range sentence was appropriate. In reviewing
the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it noted that Stone attempted to
engage in similar suspicious financial activity even after he pled guilty, which
“suggests . . . that there is a likelihood that [he] would continue to do that in the
future.” The district court was thus concerned that Stone would “reoffend in the
future in a way that puts public safety in jeopardy,” and it further explained that the

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recommended Guidelines-range sentence did not reflect the relative seriousness of
the crime. Thus, while the district court acknowledged some mitigating
factors—such as Stone’s advanced age—it ultimately varied upward and imposed
an above-Guidelines-range sentence of 51 months’ imprisonment. Stone appeals.
II.
Stone first contends that the district court erred in applying the two-level
knowledge enhancement under USSG § 2S1.3(b)(1)(A). He maintains that he
believed the deposits in his account were from legitimate foreign investors and that
there is no direct evidence that he knew they were fraudulent. “We review the
district court’s application of the Guidelines and imposition of sentencing
enhancements de novo” and “review factual findings at sentencing for clear error.”
United States v. McGhee, 129 F.4th 1095, 1102 (8th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert.
denied, 146 S. Ct. 620 (2025). Such “[f]indings will be reversed only if the entire
record definitely and firmly establishes that a mistake has been made.” United States
v. Anderson, 618 F.3d 873, 879 (8th Cir. 2010). Furthermore, “[w]hen the factual
findings by the trial court are based on the credibility of witnesses, they are ‘virtually
unreviewable.’” United States v. Moore, 242 F.3d 1080, 1081 (8th Cir. 2001)
(citation omitted).
USSG § 2S1.3(b)(1)(A) states that, in relation to money laundering or other
similar financial crimes, two levels are to be added to a defendant’s base offense
level if he “knew or believed that the funds were proceeds of unlawful activity, or
were intended to promote unlawful activity.” Here, the district court did not err in
applying the enhancement. The district court pointed to numerous facts from the
record indicating that Stone knew about the illegality of the funds, including the
suspicious nature of his companies, his moving of funds quickly between his
accounts, and the fact that he tried to deposit forged or fraudulent checks into his
accounts. The district court also found that Stone’s explanation of events, which
involved him trusting “three sets of unknown people” to transfer funds using his
accounts, was not credible—a “virtually unreviewable” finding on appeal. Moore,

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242 F.3d at 1081 (citation omitted). Thus, the district court did not err in imposing
the enhancement.
Stone next contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. “When
we review the imposition of sentences, whether inside or outside the Guidelines
range, we apply ‘a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’” United States v.
Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citation omitted). “[I]t will
be the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—whether within,
above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as substantively unreasonable.”
Id. at 464 (citation omitted).
Here, Stone acknowledges that the district court “was aware of, and did
consider, the § 3553(a) factors,” but he argues that it “should have placed more
mitigating weight” on factors such as his age and community service. However, we
have held numerous times that “a sentencing court has wide latitude to weigh the
section 3553(a) factors . . . and assign some factors greater weight than others.”
United States v. Roberts, 747 F.3d 990, 992 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Thus,
“[Stone’s] disagreement with the district court’s balancing of relevant considerations
does not show that the court abused its discretion.” United States v. Campbell, 986
F.3d 782, 800 (8th Cir. 2021).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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