Curtis Lee Morrison v. C. Hill, C.o.;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CURTIS LEE MORRISON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
C. HILL, C.O.; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-17479
D.C. No. 2:06-cv-02557-KJM-
EFB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 10, 2012**
Before: WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Curtis Lee Morrison, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and due process violations.
FILED
SEP 25 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Jett v. Penner,
439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). We may affirm on any basis supported by
the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th
Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Morrison’s Eighth
Amendment claims because Morrison failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs when they allegedly placed an inmate who was a smoker in his cell. See
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1991) (inmate must establish that prison
officials “possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind” to implicate the Eighth
Amendment); Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (deliberate indifference requires “a purposeful
act or failure to respond to pain or possible medical need”).
Dismissal of Morrison’s due process claims was proper because the record
shows that the results of the disciplinary hearing, including the loss of good-time
credits, have not been invalidated. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648
(1997) (claim for damages based on allegations “that necessarily imply the
invalidity of the punishment imposed,” including the deprivation of good-time
credits, “is not cognizable under § 1983”); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
487(1994) (if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the

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invalidity of his conviction or sentence . . . the complaint must be dismissed unless
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated” through habeas or other means).
AFFIRMED.

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