Harley Edmond Mailoa v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HARLEY EDMOND MAILOA;
LINCE ROHANI PURBA; CEISCRAD
HARLON UCOK; VICTOR YOHANES
PARLINDUNGAN,
Petitioners,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 08-70886
Agency Nos. A096-362-897
A096-362-898
A096-362-899
A096-362-900
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted February 7, 2013
Pasadena, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, TROTT, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Harley Edmond Mailoa, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for
review (along with his wife and two sons, who are derivative applicants) of the
Board of Immigration Appeals decision affirming an order of removal and denial
FILED
FEB 26 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture. We lack jurisdiction to review the decision to deny
the asylum claim, and we conclude that the denial of the other claims was
supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we dismiss in part and deny in
part the petition for review.
The asylum claim was denied primarily based on the IJ’s finding that the
application was not filed within one year of arrival. An applicant can excuse the
one-year deadline by establishing “changed circumstances” under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a)(2)(D). After an alleged changed circumstance, an applicant must apply
for asylum within a “reasonable period.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(ii). Mailoa failed
to challenge the IJ’s determination that Mailoa’s delay—assuming he could
demonstrate changed circumstances—was unreasonable. We therefore lack
jurisdiction to consider Mailoa’s challenge to the one-year bar applied to his
asylum claim. Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
Mailoa contends that the derivative asylum applications of his sons, Ceiscrad
and Victor, are not barred because they can demonstrate “extraordinary
circumstances,” to excuse the one-year deadline. An applicant can establish an
“extraordinary circumstance,” excusing an untimely application for asylum, when
the applicant was an unaccompanied minor during the one-year period after

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arriving in the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(5)(ii). Neither Ceiscrad nor
Victor were unaccompanied when they entered the United States, however, so they
cannot establish extraordinary circumstances.
At no point in the immigration proceedings, nor in his petition for review,
has Mailoa raised the sons’ ability to establish “changed circumstances” under 8
C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)(i)(C). Thus, we cannot address that issue. See Rashtabadi v.
INS, 23 F.3d 1562, 1567 (9th Cir. 1999). In addition, the Board based its adverse
credibility finding, in part, on the sons’ testimony, so that finding would pervade
the merits of any asylum claim the sons could have arguably presented.
Mailoa challenges the adverse credibility finding, but the IJ’s determination
was supported by substantial evidence. Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 973
(9th Cir. 2011) (applying pre-REAL ID Act credibility case law). The
inconsistencies in the testimony and the significant omissions from the asylum
application went to the heart of Mailoa’s claims. See id. (inconsistencies regarding
key events forming basis of asylum claim are sufficient to support an adverse
credibility finding); Kin v. Holder, 595 F.3d 1050, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 2010)
(affirming adverse credibility finding based on omissions from application when
omitted incidents formed basis of asylum application). For instance, Mailoa
omitted from his declaration in support of his application all instances of violence

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allegedly suffered by him and his family. Mailoa’s testimony, along with that of
his sons and wife, frequently emphasized the severity, proximity and frequency of
the violence in Indonesia. Even minor inconsistencies going to the heart of an
asylum claim may, considered collectively, deprive a claim of the “requisite ring of
truth.” Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the Board’s adverse
credibility finding.
Substantial evidence supported the denial of the claims for withholding of
removal and relief under the Convention. Because of the adverse credibility
finding, Mailoa presented no credible evidence of an individualized risk of future
persecution, nor sufficient evidence of past persecution. Wakkary v. Holder, 558
F.3d 1049, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that some evidence of individualized
risk is necessary to establish the sufficient likelihood of future persecution).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.

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