United States of America v. Darrell G. Jones

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DARRELL G. JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 12-30112
D.C. No. 2:11-cr-00298-JLR-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 4, 2013
Seattle, Washington
Before: FERNANDEZ, W. FLETCHER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Darrell Jones (Jones) appeals his conviction for being a felon in possession
of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We affirm.
FILED
MAR 20 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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1. In its closing argument, the government advanced plausible interpretations
of the evidence rather than misleading the jury or impugning the defense.
See United States v. Sullivan, 522 F.3d 967, 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining
that no prosecutorial misconduct occurs when reasonable inferences are
argued from the evidence). Neither did the government improperly vouch
for Deputy Lee. See United States v. Brooks, 508 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir.
2007) (describing improper vouching as “plac[ing] the prestige of the
government behind a witness” or indicating that evidence not before the jury
bolsters the witness’ testimony).
2. The district court properly determined that the no-contact violation evidence
was admissible for the purpose of presenting the background facts leading to
Jones’ arrest. See United States v. DeGeorge, 380 F.3d 1203, 1220 (9th Cir.
2004) (describing the admission of evidence that is “inextricably
intertwined” with the charged offense). Because the district court limited
use of the no-contact violation and performed the balancing test under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, no abuse of discretion occurred. See id.

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3. In the alternative, evidence of the no-contact violation was admissible under
Rule 404(b) to establish Jones’ motive for attempting to hide the gun when
he saw the police. See FRE 404(b) (providing that proof of other acts may
be admitted to prove motive).
4. The district court gave a limiting instruction to the jury that the crime could
only be considered for motive, intent, or knowledge. See United States v.
Verduzco, 373 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 2004). Because the evidence was
admissible to prove Jones’ motive, the district court’s instruction was
appropriate. See id.
AFFIRMED.

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