RONALD NEAL JOSEPH, Jr.; JANIE PITRE JOSEPH v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department; Sara Bradshaw

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RONALD NEAL JOSEPH, Jr.; JANIE
PITRE JOSEPH,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
and
HANNAH ELIZABETH JOSEPH,
Plaintiff,
v.
LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE
DEPARTMENT; SARA BRADSHAW,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-17183
D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00966-HDM-
LRL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Howard D. McKibben, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 15, 2013 **
San Francisco, California
FILED
APR 17 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, and O’SCANNLAIN and N.R. SMITH, Circuit
Judges.
Ronald Joseph Sr. and Janie Joseph sued the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department and Officer Sara Bradshaw under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the fatal
officer-involved shooting of their son, Ronald Joseph Jr. (“Ron”). They allege that
Bradshaw’s use of deadly force was excessive under the Fourth Amendment and
shocked the conscience under the Fourteenth. They further contend that the
Department’s policies contributed to the alleged constitutional violations.
Bradshaw and the Department moved for summary judgment on all claims and
prevailed. The Josephs timely appealed. We affirm.
The Josephs argue that genuine disputes of material fact remain on their
excessive force claim. We disagree. Whether or not genuine disputes remain,
none is material. The relevant facts are undisputed: as Bradshaw approached Ron,
she thought that he was committing an armed robbery. She commanded him to
drop his gun and get on the ground. He did not. Instead, he charged Bradshaw.
Whether, as he charged, he also pointed his gun at Bradshaw is ultimately
irrelevant. Either way, he posed an immediate threat to her safety. Cf. Blanford v.
Sacramento Cnty., 406 F.3d 1110, 1116 (concluding that officers were justified in
killing a suspect armed with a two-and-a-half foot sword who, when ordered to set

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the sword down, instead raised it and growled). Bradshaw was entitled to
summary judgment on this claim.
The Josephs also claim that Bradshaw violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although they allude to this claim in their jurisdictional statement and, later in the
brief, refer in passing to their constitutional interest in maintaining their
relationship with their son, they nowhere attempt to make a prima facie case of a
Fourteenth Amendment violation. Thus, the issue is waived. See Kim v. Kang,
154 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1998). In any event, the claim is meritless. The
Josephs do not dispute that Bradshaw shot Ron in self defense, which is a
legitimate law-enforcement objective. Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554–55
(9th Cir. 2010). Bradshaw was entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
The Josephs argue that the Department is liable for policies contributing to
the alleged violation. But, since there was no constitutional violation, the
Department is not liable and, thus, was entitled to summary judgment. City of Los
Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).
The Josephs also challenge the district court’s denial (without prejudice) of
Bradshaw and the Department’s motion for an award of attorney fees and costs.
The Josephs are not aggrieved by that order. See United States v. Good Samaritan
Church, 29 F.3d 487, 488 (9th Cir. 1994).
AFFIRMED.

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