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12-30232•United States of America v. Charles Edward Jackson
12-30232Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitMay 20, 2013
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Jackson’s
request for oral argument is denied.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHARLES EDWARD JACKSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 12-30232
D.C. No. 4:12-cr-00020-SEH
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 14, 2013**
Before: LEAVY, THOMAS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Charles Edward Jackson appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 96-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for
being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We
FILED
MAY 20 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS
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12-30232 2
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Jackson contends that his sentence 25 months above the high end of the
advisory Sentencing Guidelines range is illegal and substantively unreasonable.
We review the legality of a sentence de novo, see United States v. Fernandes, 636
F.3d 1254, 1255 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), and the substantive reasonableness
of a sentence for abuse of discretion, see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). Jackson’s 96-month sentence, which is two years below the applicable
statutory maximum, is both legally authorized and substantively reasonable in light
of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of circumstances,
including Jackson’s extensive history of violence and gun-related offenses. See id.
To the extent that Jackson argues that the government breached the parties’
plea agreement by advocating for a sentence above the Sentencing Guidelines
range, we decline to consider this argument because it was raised for the first time
in Jackson’s reply brief. See United States v. Mejia-Pimental, 477 F.3d 1100, 1105
n.9 (9th Cir. 2007).
AFFIRMED.
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