Lurenzo Lee Williams v. Servin, a.k.a. Cervantes

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LURENZO LEE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SERVIN, a.k.a. Cervantes,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 11-57252
D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00789-CBM-JC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Consuelo B. Marshall, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 14, 2013**
Before: LEAVY, THOMAS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Lurenzo Lee Williams appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that
defendant used excessive force against him while he was a pretrial detainee in the
county jail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
FILED
MAY 21 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315
F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Williams’s action without prejudice
because Williams did not exhaust the county jail’s grievance procedures
concerning his claims. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95 (2006)
(exhaustion is mandatory and must be done in a timely manner consistent with
prison policies); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (“[T]he PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege
excessive force or some other wrong.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’s motions
for appointment of counsel because Williams failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and requirement of “exceptional circumstances” for
appointment of counsel).
AFFIRMED.

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