In re: SHANEL ANN STASZ v. ROSENDO GONZALEZ, Chapter 7 Trustee

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: SHANEL ANN STASZ,
Debtor,
SHANEL ANN STASZ,
Appellant,
v.
ROSENDO GONZALEZ, Chapter 7
Trustee,
Appellee.
No. 11-60025
BAP No. 10-1145
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Pappas, Dunn, and Kirscher, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Submitted May 14, 2013**
Before: LEAVY, THOMAS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Chapter 7 debtor Shanel Ann Stasz appeals pro se from the Bankruptcy
FILED
MAY 22 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Appellate Panel’s (“BAP”) judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s order
compelling turnover of estate property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(d). We review de novo BAP decisions, and apply the same standard of
review that the BAP applied to the bankruptcy court’s ruling. Boyajian v. New
Falls Corp. (In re Boyajian), 564 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
The bankruptcy court properly concluded that the funds held on account of
the West Hollywood Domestic Non Grantor Trust were property of the bankruptcy
estate because the law of the case established that Stasz had rescinded that trust
before filing for bankruptcy. See Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 154 (9th Cir.
1993) (law of the case doctrine generally precludes reconsideration of an issue that
has already been decided by the same court, or a higher court, in the identical
case); see also Abele v. Phoenix Suns Ltd. P’ship (In re Harrell), 73 F.3d 218, 219
(9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (bankruptcy estate “includes ‘all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case’” (quoting
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)).
We do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. See Brown v.
Gen. Tel. Co. of Cal., 108 F.3d 208, 210 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
Stasz’s contentions concerning collateral estoppel, the trust’s alleged exempt
status, and the necessity of an adversary proceeding are unpersuasive for the

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reasons stated by the BAP.
AFFIRMED.

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