Laura T. Williams v. Los Angeles Job Corps;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LAURA T. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
LOS ANGELES JOB CORPS; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 12-55015
D.C. No. 2:11-cv-00897-SJO-PJW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 14, 2013**
Before: LEAVY, THOMAS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Laura T. Williams appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing her employment action alleging violations of federal and state law. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Pareto v. FDIC,
139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). We affirm.
FILED
MAY 22 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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12-55015 2
The district court properly dismissed Williams’s action alleging breach of
contract, harassment, discrimination, defamation, and wrongful termination
because Williams alleged so few facts that the court could infer only the possibility
of misconduct. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to survive a
motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege facts that “allow[] the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”);
Pareto, 139 F.3d at 699 (“[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted
inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’s motion
for default judgment because defendants promptly re-filed their motion to dismiss
without the original clerical error and the delay did not prejudice Williams. See
Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) (setting forth standard of
review and factors the court may consider in deciding whether to enter default
judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55).
Williams’s contention that the district court treated her unfairly is
unsupported by the record.
AFFIRMED.

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