Miguel Angel Mendoza- Calvillo v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MIGUEL ANGEL MENDOZA-
CALVILLO,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 12-70723
Agency No. A075-666-175
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 14, 2013**
Before: LEAVY, THOMAS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Miguel Angel Mendoza-Calvillo, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions
pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his
motion to reconsider and to reopen removal proceedings. Our jurisdiction is
FILED
MAY 28 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo claims of constitutional
violations. Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510, 516 (9th Cir. 2001). We dismiss in part, and
deny in part, the petition for review.
We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of Mendoza-Calvillo’s
motion to reconsider the BIA’s discretionary hardship determination. See Vilchiz-
Soto v. Holder, 688 F.3d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 2012 (order) (“[T]he BIA’s denial of
the motion to reconsider falls outside the court’s jurisdiction because the court
cannot reconsider the discretionary, fact-based determination that petitioners failed
to demonstrate the requisite hardship.”). Mendoza-Calvillo’s contentions that the
BIA’s decision was inadequate and legally incorrect, and that the BIA should have
reopened his case are not sufficiently colorable legal or constitutional claims to
establish our jurisdiction. See Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 978 (9th
Cir. 2009) (“To be colorable in this context . . . , the claim must have some
possible validity.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
We also lack jurisdiction to review Mendoza-Calvillo’s challenge to the
underlying orders denying his application for cancellation of removal because the
petition for review is not timely as to those orders. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1);
Singh v. INS, 315 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003).

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We lack jurisdiction to consider Mendoza-Calvillo’s request for
prosecutorial discretion. See Vilchiz-Soto, 688 F.3d at 644.
Mendoza-Calvillo’s claim that the denial of cancellation of removal violated
the due process rights of his United States citizen son is foreclosed by De Mercado
v. Mukasey, 566 F.3d 810, 816 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009).
Finally, the BIA sufficiently addressed Mendoza-Calvillo’s request to
reopen his proceedings. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir.
2010) (the BIA need only “announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a
reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted”
(internal quotations omitted)).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.

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