Adegbenga Adesokan v. U.s. Bank, N.a.;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ADEGBENGA ADESOKAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
U.S. BANK, N.A.; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 12-15560
D.C. No. 1:11-cv-01236-LJO
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 25, 2014**
Before: HAWKINS, TALLMAN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Adegbenga Adesokan appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his diversity action arising out of foreclosure proceedings. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)
FILED
JUL 02 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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(order). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, Johnson v. Riverside
Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Adesokan’s wrongful foreclosure,
quiet title, cancellation of instruments, and fraud claims because Adesokan failed
to allege facts showing tender in the amount of his indebtedness or that the
foreclosure sale was void. See Arnolds Mgmt. Corp. v. Eischen, 205 Cal. Rptr. 15,
17-18 (Ct. App. 1984) (affirming dismissal of fraud claim because failure to tender
bars any claims “implicitly integrated” with foreclosure); Karlsen v. Am. Sav. &
Loan Ass’n, 92 Cal. Rptr. 851, 854 (Ct. App. 1971) (“A valid and viable tender of
payment of the indebtedness owing is essential to an action to cancel a voidable
sale under a deed of trust.”); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 2934a(d) (recorded
substitution of trustee constitutes conclusive evidence of the authority of the
substituted trustee); West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285,
301-02 (Ct. App. 2013) (rejecting claim that trustee’s sale was void because
substituted trustee had authority to act as trustee under section 2934a(d)).
Dismissal of Adesokan’s claim alleging violations of California’s Unfair
Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, was proper because
Adesokan lacked standing to maintain a UCL claim based on the alleged fraud.
See Jenkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 912, 933-34 (Ct.
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App. 2013) (affirming dismissal of UCL challenge to foreclosure where plaintiff’s
default caused the foreclosure).
We reject Adesokan’s contention that the involvement of a magistrate judge
violated his due process rights because the magistrate judge did not enter
dispositive orders, and the district judge properly conducted a de novo review of
the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations and Adesokan’s objections,
and entered final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B)-(C); Estate of Conners
by Meredith v. O’Connor, 6 F.3d 656, 658 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing scope of
magistrate judge’s authority under § 636(b)(1)(B)).
AFFIRMED.
12-15560 3

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