Lee V. Quillar v. RICK HILL, Warden

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LEE V. QUILLAR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
V.
RICK HILL, Warden,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 13-15001
D.C. No. 2:04-cv-01203-KJM-
CKD
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 25, 2014**
Before: HAWKINS, TALLMAN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Lee V. Quillar appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment, on the basis of the mootness doctrine, in his 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action alleging a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Person’s Act (“RLUIPA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
FILED
JUL 07 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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review de novo, Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch., 228 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir.
2000), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Quillar failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether there remained any case or
controversy warranting further relief after defendants expunged the disciplinary
reports related to grooming violations that Quillar challenged under RLUIPA, and
restored his classification status, loss of credits, and access to privileges as if the
reports were never issued. See Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“A claim is moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria, 160 F.3d 543, 549 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The
basic question in determining mootness is whether there is a present controversy as
to which effective relief can be granted.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Quillar’s contentions that defendant erroneously failed to expunge a June 22,
2005 disciplinary report or restore his classification status from “A2B” to “A1A;”
that court-appointed pro bono counsel in his prior appeal and on remand prejudiced
his ability to prosecute his claims; and that the district court prevented him from
submitting relevant evidence on summary judgment, are unpersuasive.
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Defendant’s motion for judicial notice, filed on June 18, 2013, is granted.
See Fed. R. Evid. 201.
AFFIRMED.
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