Rafael Mateos Sandoval v. County of Sonoma;

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAFAEL MATEOS SANDOVAL and
SIMEON AVENDANO RUIZ,
individually and as class representatives,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
COUNTY OF SONOMA; et al.,
Defendants - Appellants,
And
CITY OF SANTA ROSA; et al.,
Defendants.
No. 13-15250
D.C. No. 3:11-cv-05817-THE
Northern District of California,
San Francisco
ORDER
Before: TASHIMA, McKEOWN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
The memorandum filed on February 17, 2015, is hereby amended. An
amended memorandum is filed concurrently with this order.
With these amendments, the panel has voted to deny the petition for panel
rehearing.
The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing and rehearing en
banc and no judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc.
Fed. R. App. P. 35.
FILED
MAR 27 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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The petition for panel rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc are
DENIED. No further petitions for en banc or panel rehearing shall be permitted.

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAFAEL MATEOS SANDOVAL and
SIMEON AVENDANO RUIZ,
individually and as class representatives,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
COUNTY OF SONOMA; et al.,
Defendants - Appellants,
And
CITY OF SANTA ROSA; et al.,
Defendants.
No. 13-15250
D.C. No. 3:11-cv-05817-THE
AMENDED
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Thelton E. Henderson, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 12, 2015**
San Francisco California
FILED
MAR 27 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Before: TASHIMA, McKEOWN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
The County of Sonoma, the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office, and Sonoma
County Sheriff-Coroner Steve Freitas appeal the district court’s denial of their
motion to dismiss this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit. We have jurisdiction under the
collateral order doctrine. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,
506 U.S. 139, 141 (1993). On de novo review, Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 554
F.3d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 2009), we affirm.
Defendants are not entitled to sovereign immunity, which does not apply to
“suits prosecuted against a municipal corporation or other governmental entity
which is not an arm of the State.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999). We
also reject defendants’ argument that they are not “persons” subject to suit under
§ 1983 because they do not have “final policymaking authority.” The named
defendants are officials “whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Indeed,
plaintiffs allege that defendants have adopted a vehicle impound policy that
violates both the California Vehicle Code and the United States Constitution.
Defendants also assert that they are not subject to suit under § 1983 because
county sheriffs act as state, rather than county, officials when enforcing the
California Vehicle Code. In Brewster v. Shasta County, 275 F.3d 803 (9th Cir.
2

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2001), we held that “California sheriffs are county actors when investigating
crime.” Id. at 811. Three years later, in Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 87 P.3d
1 (Cal. 2004), the California Supreme Court disagreed.
Despite these conflicting holdings, interpretation of federal statutes such as
§ 1983 is a matter of federal law, not state law. Streit v. Cnty. of L.A., 236 F.3d
552, 560 (9th Cir. 2001). Defendants’ arguments are foreclosed by Jackson v.
Barnes, 749 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, No. 14-542, 2015 WL 133021
(U.S. Jan. 12, 2015). As we clarified in that case, Venegas “does not constitute ‘an
intervening decision on controlling state law’ that would authorize, let alone
require, us to overrule a prior decision.” Id. at 766 (quoting Miller v. Gammie, 355
F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)).
There is no material difference between the criminal investigations at issue
in Brewster and the California Vehicle Code enforcement actions alleged to be
unconstitutional in this suit. The district court correctly denied defendants’ motion
to dismiss.1 At this stage of the proceedings, we do not address whether qualified
immunity might be available to defendants. We leave that question to the district
court in the first instance.
1 Defendants’ motion to supplement the record and file supplemental
briefing is denied.
3

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AFFIRMED.
4

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