Glenn Winningham, house of fearn v. County of Navajo, named as: County of Navajo, Inc.;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GLENN WINNINGHAM, house of fearn,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF NAVAJO, named as:
County of Navajo, Inc.; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 13-16448
D.C. No. 2:13-cv-01120-NVW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 7, 2015**
Before: FISHER, TALLMAN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Glenn Winningham appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging federal claims in connection with the imposition of
property taxes. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo
FILED
APR 15 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Winningham’s action because
Winningham failed to state a cognizable claim. See id. at 341-42 (though pro se
pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual
allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); Johnson v. Riverside
Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal may be based on either a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence
of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
We reject Winningham’s contention that the district court pre-judged his
case.
AFFIRMED.
13-16448 2

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