Allstate Insurance Company v. Ellery Chacksfield

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ELLERY CHACKSFIELD,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 13-55854
D.C. No. 3:11-cv-02871-AJB-JMA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 5, 2015
Pasadena, California
Before: FISHER, BEA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Allstate Insurance Company brought this action seeking a declaration that
Gordon Hammers’s umbrella insurance policy did not cover damages arising out of
a car accident with Ellery Chacksfield for which Gordon’s brother Robert had been
found responsible because Robert was not a “resident of [Gordon’s] household.”
In response to cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
FILED
MAY 20 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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concluded that Robert was a resident of Gordon’s household and granted summary
judgment to Chacksfield. We reverse and remand for entry of summary judgment
in favor of Allstate.
Residents of the same household must live “under one roof or within a
common curtilage.” Jacobs v. Fire Ins. Exch., 278 Cal. Rptr. 52, 58 (Ct. App.
1991). Robert and Gordon did not live “under one roof” because Robert lived in a
separate trailer and had been prohibited to enter Gordon’s house, and we disagree
with the district court’s conclusion that Robert and Gordon lived within a common
curtilage.
California courts seem to apply the same definition of “curtilage” in both the
insurance coverage and Fourth Amendment contexts. See People v. DiMatteo, No.
A105694, 2005 WL 20005, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2005) (unpublished) (citing
Jacobs, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 57 n.4); see also Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Granite State
Ins. Co., 330 F.3d 1214, 1220 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “we may consider
unpublished state decisions, even though such opinions have no precedential
value”). Under that definition, to determine the extent of a home’s curtilage, courts
consider “(1) ‘the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home’; (2)
‘whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home’; (3) ‘the

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nature of the uses to which the area is put’; and (4) ‘the steps taken by the resident to
protect the area from observation by people passing by.’” People v. Lieng, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 200, 207 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301
(1987)).
Applying these factors, we conclude that Robert and Gordon did not live
within a common curtilage. First, Robert’s trailer was more than 100 feet from
Gordon’s home, and “even in rural areas, it is rare for curtilage to extend more than
100 feet beyond the home.” Id. at 208. Second, Robert’s trailer was enclosed
within its own fence. Third, Robert’s trailer and Gordon’s home did not share uses
in common. Thus, three factors weigh decisively in favor of the conclusion that
Robert and Gordon did not share a common curtilage. The fourth factor is not
obviously to the contrary, and would not outweigh the other three factors even if it
were.
We reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Chacksfield, and remand with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of
Allstate.
REVERSED and REMANDED.

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