SARA YAZMIN SANCHEZ- RESENDEZ, AKA Sara Yazmin Sanchez- Resendiz v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SARA YAZMIN SANCHEZ-
RESENDEZ, AKA Sara Yazmin Sanchez-
Resendiz,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 09-71588
Agency No. A078-048-655
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted July 9, 2015
San Francisco, California
Before: TALLMAN, M. SMITH, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Sara Sanchez-Resendez is a native and citizen of Mexico. She
became a lawful permanent resident in 2003. She petitions for review of the Board
of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) conclusion that her conviction for facilitation of
unlawful transportation of marijuana for sale, in violation of Arizona Revised
FILED
JUL 24 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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Statutes §§ 13-1004, 13-3405(A)(4), 13-3405(B)(11), is a crime involving moral
turpitude, subjecting her to removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). We have
jurisdiction to review whether Sanchez’s conviction involves moral turpitude. See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). We deny Sanchez’s petition.
After entering a guilty plea, Sanchez was convicted under two sections: (1)
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1004 (facilitation) and (2) Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3405(A)(4)
(prohibiting, among other acts, the unlawful transportation of marijuana for sale).
As an initial matter, Sanchez argues that we should not consider the underlying
drug crime in determining whether her conviction involved moral turpitude. This
argument is squarely foreclosed by our prior opinion in Barragan-Lopez v.
Mukasey, 508 F.3d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 2007), which looked to the underlying drug
crime when determining whether a conviction for solicitation of possession of
marijuana for sale involved moral turpitude. Facilitation, like solicitation, is an
inchoate offense that relies on an underlying, substantive crime. See Ariz. Rev.
Stat. §§ 13-1004(A), 13-1005; In re Christopher R., 957 P.2d 1004, 1005–1006
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). Therefore, we must look to the underlying drug crime to
determine whether Sanchez’s conviction constitutes a crime involving moral
turpitude. See Barragan-Lopez, 508 F.3d at 903; see also Rohit v. Holder, 670
F.3d 1085, 1089–90 (9th Cir. 2012).
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In determining whether Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3405(A)(4) constitutes a crime
involving moral turpitude, we employ a two-part analysis. See Descamps v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283–85 (2013). The first part is the application of the
categorical approach. Id. at 2283. If the statute is divisible and does not qualify
under the categorical approach, we may apply the modified categorical approach.
Id. at 2284–85.
Section 13-3405(A)(4) is divisible because it contains multiple, alternative
elements of functionally separate crimes. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285; see
also Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 2014). We assume, but do
not decide, that the full range of conduct covered by Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-
3405(A)(4) is broader than the federal definition of “drug trafficking offense,”
which generally involves moral turpitude. See Barragan-Lopez, 508 F.3d at
903–04. However, because at least some of the alternative elements are clearly
matches, we apply the modified categorical approach. See Rodriguez-Castellon v.
Holder, 733 F.3d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285).
Looking at the record of conviction, Sanchez pled guilty to, and was
convicted of, facilitating the unlawful transportation of marijuana for sale.
Because Sanchez’s conviction included a “for sale” element, the conviction
constituted a drug trafficking offense and therefore involved moral turpitude. See
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Barragan-Lopez, 508 F.3d at 903–04 (concluding that possession of marijuana for
sale was a crime of moral turpitude); Atl. Richfield Co. v. Guerami, 820 F.2d 280,
282 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that “possession of heroin for sale” is a “crime of
moral turpitude”). The BIA’s decision was not in error.
PETITION DENIED.
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