Roneel Singh v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RONEEL SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 12-70941
Agency No. A055-041-357
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 8, 2015**
San Francisco, California
Before: TALLMAN, M. SMITH, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Roneel Singh (Petitioner), a native and citizen of Fiji, petitions for review of
a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an Immigration
Judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
FILED
JUL 28 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

-- 1 of 3 --

Because the Petitioner has been convicted of an aggravated felony, and was
removable on that basis, our jurisdiction to review the BIA and the IJ’s
determination that the Petitioner was statutorily ineligible for withholding of
removal is limited to colorable legal or constitutional claims. 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(C), (D); Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2009).
Neither of the Petitioner’s arguments regarding the IJ and the BIA’s
determination that he was convicted of a particularly serious crime is a colorable
legal or constitutional claim. The Petitioner first contends that the IJ and the BIA
failed to individually consider the circumstances of his case. In determining
whether a conviction was for a particularly serious crime, the BIA considers “the
nature of the conviction, the circumstances and underlying facts of the conviction,
the type of sentence imposed, and, most importantly, whether the type and
circumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the
community.” Matter of Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (B.I.A. 1982). The IJ
applied these factors and the BIA affirmed. The Petitioner’s argument to the
contrary lacks any arguable merit, and is not a colorable legal claim. See Mendez-
Castro, 552 F.3d at 978.
The Petitioner also contends that the case was squarely controlled by Matter
of Frentescu because the facts of that case were indistinguishable from the facts of
2

-- 2 of 3 --

this case. This contention does not assert legal or constitutional error, but is
“nothing more than an argument that the IJ abused his discretion.” See id. We
therefore lack jurisdiction to consider it.
We have jurisdiction to review the IJ and the BIA’s merits-based
determination that the Petitioner was not entitled to deferral of removal under the
CAT. See Pechenkov v. Holder, 705 F.3d 444, 448 (9th Cir. 2012). The IJ and the
BIA did not err in concluding that the Petitioner had not met his burden to
demonstrate that it was “more likely than not that he . . . would be tortured if
removed to” Fiji. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).
PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.
3

-- 3 of 3 --