Rob Lear v. Seattle Housing Authority;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROB LEAR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SEATTLE HOUSING AUTHORITY; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 14-35276
D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00347-JLR
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 25, 2015**
Before: McKEOWN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Rob Lear appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants conspired to harm him and
deprive him of his property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
FILED
SEP 08 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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review de novo. Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 436 (9th Cir. 2002). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lear’s conspiracy
claims because Lear failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
defendants had an agreement to violate his constitutional rights. See id. at 441
(elements of § 1983 conspiracy); see also Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics
C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011) (“To survive summary
judgment, a plaintiff must set forth non-speculative evidence of specific facts, not
sweeping conclusory allegations.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lear’s request for
an injunction in his state eviction proceedings because the proceedings were
unrelated to the instant action. See Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d
1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and factors for
evaluating an injunction request).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lear’s discovery
requests because they were untimely. See Childress v. Darby Lumber, Inc., 357
F.3d 1000, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth standard of review for discovery
issues).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lear’s motion for
recusal because the judge’s impartiality could not reasonably be questioned. See
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United States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth
standard of review and discussing grounds for recusal).
We reject Lear’s arguments that the district court held Lear’s pleadings to a
heightened standard, and failed to address his motion for summary judgment.
We do not consider issues or arguments not specifically and distinctly raised
and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.
14-35276 3

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