Adam Gordy v. ANTHONY HEDGPETH, Warden

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ADAM GORDY,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
ANTHONY HEDGPETH, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
No. 12-56854
D.C. No. 2:11-cv-06512-GW-JPR
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 31, 2015
Pasadena, California
Before: GRABER, RAWLINSON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
1. The state courts did not unreasonably apply Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S.
162 (1975), or rest their decision on an unreasonable determination of the facts, in
denying Adam Gordy’s requests for a second competency hearing. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). The state trial court denied those requests, despite behavior by Gordy
FILED
SEP 16 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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that might otherwise have justified a second hearing, primarily because the court
believed that Gordy was feigning his behavior for the purpose of delaying the trial.
In the months preceding Gordy’s first competency hearing, three of five examining
psychiatrists found that he was malingering and was competent to stand trial. In
determining whether or not there was reason to doubt Gordy’s competence, the
state trial court properly referenced those medical evaluations and made numerous
observations on the record documenting that Gordy’s actions appeared strategic
rather than authentic, including his act of cutting his hands in open court. See
Drope, 420 U.S. at 180. Both the state trial and appellate courts reasonably
grounded their decision on the disjunction between Gordy’s sedated demeanor and
verbal outbursts, on the one hand, and his ability to coherently testify and argue on
his own behalf, on the other.
2. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), we must also defer to the state appellate
court’s reasonable determination that confining Gordy to a restraint chair during
trial was not an abuse of discretion. After Gordy smuggled several razor blades
into court and cut himself, the state trial court made an individualized assessment
that Gordy posed a safety risk to himself and others. The court also found that less
restrictive alternatives to the chair would be insufficient. Moreover, even if Gordy
were able to show that the jury understood he was in a restraint chair, he failed to

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establish that the restraints had a substantial and injurious effect on the
determination of his verdict. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993).
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Gordy’s
request for court-appointed habeas counsel because “the interests of justice” did
not warrant appointment. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). Gordy, with the assistance
of a fellow prisoner, had already filed a 66-page habeas petition. The district court
permissibly concluded that appointment of counsel would not be required unless an
evidentiary hearing were held, which the court ultimately did not order. Gordy still
had to file a reply brief in support of his petition, but he was able to secure the
assistance of private counsel in preparing that brief.
AFFIRMED.

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