MARCO CELIS-BRICENO, AKA Marco Antonio Celis-Briceno v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARCO CELIS-BRICENO, AKA Marco
Antonio Celis-Briceno,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 14-72273
Agency No. A072-111-212
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 24, 2016**
Before: REINHARDT, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Marco Celis-Briceno, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 2 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 14-72273
(“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo the
question of whether an IJ’s denial of a continuance violated a petitioner’s statutory
right to counsel, Montes-Lopez v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 2012), and
we grant the petition for review and remand.
Celis-Briceno argues his statutory right to counsel, which he never waived,
was violated when the IJ denied his request for a continuance. We conclude, on
the facts of this case, the IJ erred in denying Celis-Briceno’s request for a
continuance. See Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting
what constitutes reasonable time to locate counsel is a fact-specific inquiry and
discussing relevant factors); id. at 1100 (“[A]t a minimum [IJs] must inquire
whether the petitioner wishes counsel, determine a reasonable period for obtaining
counsel, and assess whether any waiver of counsel is knowing and voluntary.”).
Thus, we grant Celis-Briceno’s petition for review, and we remand for
further proceedings consistent with this disposition.
In light of our remand, we do not reach Celis-Briceno’s remaining
contentions.
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REMANDED.

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