Paramjit Singh v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PARAMJIT SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 13-74266
Agency No. A205-243-560
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 14, 2016**
Before: BEA, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Paramjit Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 21 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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(“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for
substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards
governing adverse credibility determinations created by the REAL ID Act,
Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010), and we review de
novo due process claims, Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 2010).
We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination
based on inconsistencies as to the length of Singh’s first detention and the amount
his father paid a smuggler to bring him to the United States, as well as on the
omission from Singh’s father’s affidavit of Singh’s first detention, beating, and
subsequent hospitalization. See id. at 1048 (adverse credibility determination was
reasonable under the “totality of circumstances”). The explanations Singh raised
before the BIA do not compel a contrary result, see Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241,
1245 (9th Cir. 2000), and we lack jurisdiction to consider the contentions Singh
raises for the first time in his opening brief, see Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674,
678 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring administrative exhaustion of legal claims). We
reject Singh’s contention that the IJ applied the wrong legal standard. In the
absence of credible testimony, Singh’s asylum and withholding of removal claims

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fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of Singh’s CAT claim
because it was based on the same evidence found not credible and the record does
not otherwise compel the finding that it is more likely than not Singh would be
tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to
India. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048-49.
Finally, we reject Singh’s contentions that the IJ violated his due process
rights. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d at 1046 (requiring error to prevail on a due
process claim).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

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