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15-30179•United States of America v. Titus Mark Bryant
15-30179Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitJun 22, 2016
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TITUS MARK BRYANT,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 15-30179
D.C. No. 1:14-cr-00094-SPW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Susan P. Watters, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 14, 2016**
Before: BEA, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Titus Mark Bryant appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges
the 60-month sentence and a special condition of supervised release imposed
following his guilty-plea conviction for three counts of assault resulting in serious
bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6). We have jurisdiction under 28
FILED
JUN 22 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the sentence, vacate the special condition of supervised
release, and remand for further proceedings.
Bryant contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of
his post-offense rehabilitation. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The above-Guidelines sentence is
substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and
the totality of the circumstances, including Bryant’s criminal history, the need to
protect the public, and the seriousness of the offense. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
Bryant also contends, and the government concedes, that remand is required
because the district court failed to provide advance notice of its intent to impose a
special condition of supervised release requiring Bryant to comply with the violent
offender registration requirements of any state in which he resides. We agree. See
United States v. Wise, 391 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Where a condition of
supervised release is not on the list of mandatory or discretionary conditions in the
sentencing guidelines, notice is required before it is imposed.”). Accordingly, we
vacate the condition and remand to permit the district court to determine whether
to reimpose the condition. If the court chooses to reimpose the condition, it shall
provide adequate notice to the parties so that an objection can be made. We
express no view as to whether the challenged condition is appropriate in this case.
AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part; and REMANDED.
15-30179 2
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