United States of America v. Maria Gonzalez-Torres

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MARIA GONZALEZ-TORRES,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15-30138
D.C. No. 3:11-cr-00517-HZ-2
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Marco A. Hernandez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 6, 2016**
Portland, Oregon
Before: PREGERSON, BEA, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Maria Gonzalez-Torres appeals the district court’s order striking from her
criminal judgment a requirement that administratively forfeited drug proceeds be
FILED
JUL 21 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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used to satisfy her mandatory restitution obligation for her food stamp fraud
conviction. We affirm.
The district court’s restitution order was mandatory for Gonzalez’s crime of
food stamp fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. The Oregon Department of Human
Services was the victim of the food stamp fraud, an offense distinct from the drug
offense that generated $84,249 seized and forfeited from Gonzalez. Accordingly,
the drug proceeds cannot be used to repay money she stole from the state’s food
stamp program. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(e)(6) (although the Attorney General is
authorized to transfer forfeited property or funds under limited circumstances as
restoration to “any victim of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture,” the Attorney
General does not have the power to transfer forfeited funds to satisfy mandatory
restitution orders as to a distinct offense).
Further, even if the forfeited money was generated from the same crime for
which the court ordered restitution, only the Attorney General or his designee—not
the courts—has the authority to transfer forfeited funds to compensate a victim.
See id.
Moreover, the forfeited drug proceeds were never Gonzalez’s to use to
satisfy her mandatory restitution obligation. The plea agreement prohibited
Gonzalez from making such a request because she agreed that “forfeiture of
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defendant’s assets shall not be treated as satisfaction of any . . . restitution.” In
addition, Gonzalez never held title to the funds in the first place. Under the
relation back doctrine, the United States’ interest in the forfeited monies vested
when the defendant committed the crime. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c). Gonzalez’s
obligation to pay restitution to the Oregon Department of Human Services cannot
lawfully be satisfied from forfeited monies that belonged to the United States from
the moment the funds were generated from drug distribution.
Finally, the court’s directive that the Oregon Department of Human Services
should be paid from forfeited drug proceeds was factually impossible to enforce
because the cash had been administratively seized by and forfeited to the
government prior to Gonzalez’s sentencing.
AFFIRMED.
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