United States of America v. John Doe

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHN DOE,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 15-50263
D.C. No.
2:13-cr-00470-JAK-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 29, 2016**
Pasadena, California
Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
John Doe appeals from his conviction for attempted reentry by a removed
alien. We conclude that his collateral attack on the underlying removal order lacks
merit and therefore affirm.
FILED
AUG 31 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Doe was not deprived of due process in his prior removal proceedings, given
the circumstances there. Group removal hearings are not unconstitutional in and of
themselves. United States v. Nicholas-Armenta, 763 F.2d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir.
1985). Doe’s sole contention is that the immigration judge should have advised
him how to present sensitive information concerning his eligibility for relief
without disclosing it to the group. However, the immigration judge twice asked
Doe if he had any fear of returning to his designated country of removal, and Doe
affirmed both times that he had no such fear. Cf. Valencia v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d
1261, 1262–63 (9th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that the respondent must at least express
fear of returning to the country of removal in order to trigger the immigration
judge’s duty to advise of eligibility for relief). The immigration judge had no
reason to doubt Doe’s answer and had no indication otherwise of Doe’s alleged
need to present information to him privately. We thus cannot say that the judge’s
failure to advise Doe how to do so was “so fundamentally unfair that the alien was
prevented from reasonably presenting his case.” Gutierrez v. Holder, 662 F.3d
1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
Because we hold that Doe was not entitled to this advisal, we need not
address whether he was prejudiced by its absence.
AFFIRMED.

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