Catherine Bryan v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CATHERINE BRYAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING,
INC.; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 13-56681
D.C. No.
3:10-cv-01605-CAB-KSC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Cathy Ann Bencivengo, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 21, 2017**
Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Catherine Bryan appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in her action alleging violation of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and other
claims concerning a loan secured by real property that she co-owned with her
FILED
SEP 22 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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mother Betty Bryan. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo, Edwards v. Wells Fargo & Co., 606 F.3d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 2010), and we
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Bryan’s TILA
claim and other related claims on the basis that Betty Bryan obtained the loan for a
business purpose, and the TILA disclosure requirements therefore did not apply.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(i), 1603(1), & 1631(a) (providing that certain disclosures
must be made when a credit transaction is primarily for personal purposes, but not
when a transaction is primarily for business purposes); see Johnson v. Wells Fargo
Home Mortg., Inc., 635 F.3d 401, 417-18 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a loan to
acquire, improve, or maintain non-owner occupied rental property was a loan for a
business purpose).
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Bryan’s
claim for wrongful foreclosure and other claims arising from the foreclosure sale of
the property because Bryan failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether she had conveyed her interest in the property to a corporation prior to the
foreclosure sale, and thus Bryan lacked standing to pursue these claims. See
Kirola v. City & Cty. of S.F., 860 F.3d 1164, 1174 (9th Cir. 2017).
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Bryan also lacked standing to pursue claims under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act because her mother Betty Bryan was the
only borrower on the loan. See 12 U.S.C. § 2601; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(e), 1692a(3);
Kirola, 860 F.3d at 1174.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bryan’s motion for
reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and (d)(3). See
Benson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 2012)
(setting forth standard of review).
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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