A. Edward Ezor v. Reva G. Goetz;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
A. EDWARD EZOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
REVA G. GOETZ; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16-55801
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00562-JVS-AGR
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 26, 2017**
Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
A. Edward Ezor appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from probate proceedings.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 4 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2003). We affirm.
The district court properly concluded that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine over Ezor’s claims against
defendants Goetz, Aldrich, Kitching, and the Estate of H. Walter Croskey because
these claims amounted to a forbidden “de facto appeal” of a prior, final state court
judgment. See id. at 1163 (“It is a forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker-
Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal wrong
allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that
court.”); Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 901-02 (9th Cir. 2003) (due process
claim against state court judge for bias was “inextricably intertwined” with the
state court’s decision, and thus beyond the federal court’s subject matter
jurisdiction). Contrary to Ezor’s contention, the extrinsic fraud exception to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because Ezor did not allege any facts
showing that he was prevented from presenting his claims in state court. See
Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) (Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not apply if extrinsic fraud prevented a party from presenting his
claim in state court).
We reject as unsupported by the record Ezor’s contentions that Magistrate
Judge Rosenberg was biased and should have been disqualified.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

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in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Ezor’s request to strike the answering brief, set forth in his reply brief, is
denied.
Ezor’s motion for an order to interplead disputed funds (Docket Entry No.
11) is denied.
AFFIRMED.

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