Cullen M. Hankerson v. Department of Risk Management;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CULLEN M. HANKERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF RISK
MANAGEMENT; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 15-35580
D.C. No. 3:13-cv-06036-BHS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 26, 2017**
Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Former Washington state prisoner Cullen M. Hankerson appeals pro se from
the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
constitutional violations arising from the alleged failure to investigate a tort claim.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Marsh v.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 5 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hankerson § 1983
claims against defendant Pressel because Hankerson failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether Pressel caused a deprivation of any federal or
constitutional right in his handling of Hankerson’s tort claim. See id. (elements of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hankerson’s
§ 1983 claims against the Department of Risk Management because “state agencies
are . . . protected from suit under § 1983.” Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 364
(9th Cir. 2004).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hankerson’s
retaliation claim against defendant Combo because Hankerson failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Combo took any adverse action
against Hankerson for filing civil complaints. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d
559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth elements of a retaliation claim in the
prison context).
The district court properly granted summary judgment regarding
Hankerson’s RICO claims because Hankerson failed to allege facts sufficient to
state plausible claims for relief. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th
Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff still

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must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hankerson’s
motions for leave to amend his complaint to add additional defendants and claims.
See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir.
2003) (setting forth standard of review and factors for permitting leave to amend).
We reject as unsupported by the record Hankerson’s contentions concerning
judicial bias, discovery issues, and collusion between defense counsel and the
district court.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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