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16-17243•James Williams v. CLARK, Officer, Metropolitan Police;
16-17243Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitOct 5, 2017
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMES WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CLARK, Officer, Metropolitan Police; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16-17243
D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00414-APG-PAL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 26, 2017**
Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
James Williams appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his action alleging various federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s
dismissal as a sanction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f), Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 5 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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2 16-17243
833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987), and we affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Williams’s
action because Williams failed to comply with court orders, including filing a pre-
trial order, despite being ordered twice to do so. See id. at 130-32 (discussing the
five factors the district court must weigh before dismissing a case for failure to
comply with a court order).
Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Williams’s action for
failure to comply with court orders, we do not consider Williams’s challenges to
the district court’s interlocutory orders. See Al-Torki v. Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381,
1386 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[I]nterlocutory orders, generally appealable after final
judgment, are not appealable after a dismissal for failure to prosecute, whether the
failure to prosecute is purposeful or is a result of negligence or mistake.” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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