United States of America v. Joseph Lee Eldabaa

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH LEE ELDABAA,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 16-30233
D.C. No.
6:15-cr-00011-CCL-2
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Charles C. Lovell, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 5, 2017**
Seattle, Washington
Before: LIPEZ,*** WARDLAW, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Joseph Lee Eldabaa (“Eldabaa”) appeals his conviction based on the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during an investigatory
FILED
OCT 30 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Kermit V. Lipez, United States Circuit Judge for the
First Circuit, sitting by designation.

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traffic stop and statements made to law enforcement officers while in custody. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.
1. The district court correctly concluded that, given the “totality-of-the-
circumstances,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983), there was reasonable
suspicion to believe that participants in the drug conspiracy were in the truck the
officers stopped. See id.; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). Contemporaneous
information from a reliable confidential informant indicated that Eldabaa’s co-
defendant Joe Jayne would be found in the truck. See United States v. Rowland,
464 F.3d 899, 907–08 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Courts look to several factors to determine
the reliability of an informant’s tip” including: whether it was a known informant;
whether the informant has provided accurate information in the past; and the basis
of knowledge of the informant’s tip.). Accordingly, the evidence that was obtained
as a result of that stop was untainted.
2. The district court correctly held that the agents did not engage in an
illegal two-step interrogation in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1996), because Eldabaa was not subject to interrogation prior to being
Mirandized. Interrogation is limited to “any words or actions on the part of the
police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Rhode
2

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Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). The officers here merely provided an
introductory overview of the investigation, which was nothing more than words or
actions “normally attendant to arrest and custody,” United States v.
Moreno-Flores, 33 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 1994), and Eldabaa spontaneously
interrupted that overview. Accordingly, the statements made by Eldabaa were also
admissible.
3. The district court also correctly held that Eldabaa’s confessions were
voluntary because there was no evidence that his will was overborne by the
circumstances surrounding his confession and it was not the product of improper
law enforcement coercion. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433–34
(2000). The officers spoke in calm, non-threatening tones with no other signs of
coercive behavior, the interview was relatively brief, the interview room was
unremarkable, Eldabaa was mature and familiar with law enforcement proceedings,
Eldabaa was in good physical and mental condition, and Eldabaa was accustomed
to exercising independent judgment by virtue of his age. These factors all indicate
that Eldabaa’s confessions were voluntary.
AFFIRMED.
3

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