Barbara Stennes-Cox v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC;

16-35251Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitNov 1, 2017

Full text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BARBARA STENNES-COX,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16-35251
D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01682-TSZ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 23, 2017**
Before: LEAVY, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Barbara Stennes-Cox appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her action alleging a Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) claim for rescission. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 1 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 16-35251
2010). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Stennes-Cox’s action as time-barred
because Stennes-Cox did not send a notice of rescission to defendants within three
years of consummation of the loan. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (providing a right of
rescission within three years of the date of the consummation of a loan if the lender
fails to make required disclosures to the borrower); Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 790, 792 (2015) (a borrower may exercise right of
rescission by notifying the lender of borrower’s intent to rescind within three years
after the transaction is consummated); Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d
1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[Section] 1635(f) is a statute of repose, depriving the
courts of subject matter jurisdiction when a § 1635 claim is brought outside the
three-year limitation period.”). We reject as without merit Stennes-Cox’s
contention that the subject loan transaction was not consummated.
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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