Wallace Jones v. the Best Service Company

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WALLACE JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THE BEST SERVICE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 17-55213
D.C. No. 2:14-cv-09872-SS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Suzanne H. Segal, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted October 23, 2017***
Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges
Wallace Jones appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his action alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). We have jurisdiction under 28
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 8 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 17-55213
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell, 845 F.3d 984,
988 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Jones’s FCRA claim because Jones
failed to allege that the defendant, a debt collector, had requested his credit report
for any reason other than to attempt to collect on the debt, and requesting a credit
report with the intent to collect on a debt is one of the permissible purposes under
the FCRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42
(9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, plaintiff must
allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim).
The district court properly dismissed Jones’s FDCPA claim because Jones
failed to allege facts sufficient to show actionable conduct under the FDCPA. See
15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) (explaining prohibited practices under the FDCPA);
Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42.
We do not consider claims dismissed with leave to amend that Jones failed
to re-allege in his second amended complaint. See Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v.
Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 973 n.14 (9th Cir. 2013) (failure to replead
claims after dismissal with leave to amend amounts to waiver).
AFFIRMED.

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