Jose Carranza Carrillo v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE CARRANZA CARRILLO,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 13-74327
Agency No. A200-104-773
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Department of Homeland Security
Submitted November 15, 2017**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Jose Carranza Carrillo, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review
of an order by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) reinstating his 2006
expedited removal order. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Our
review of DHS’ reinstatement order is “limited to confirming the agency’s
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 20 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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compliance with the reinstatement regulations.” Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008). We deny in part and dismiss
in part the petition for review.
The DHS did not err in issuing Carranza Carrillo’s reinstatement order
where Carranza Carrillo does not dispute his alienage, and the record shows he was
subject to a prior order of removal and that he illegally reentered the United States
subsequent to that order. See id. (court’s jurisdiction over a reinstatement order is
limited to reviewing “three discrete inquiries an immigration officer must make in
order to reinstate a removal order: (1) whether the petitioner is an alien; (2)
whether the petitioner was subject to a prior removal order, and (3) whether the
petitioner re-entered illegally.” (citation omitted)).
We reject Carranza Carrillo’s contention that the reinstatement order is
defective where the record contains Carranza Carrillo’s prior order of expedited
removal.
We lack jurisdiction to consider Carranza Carrillo’s collateral attack on his
underlying 2006 expedited removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2); see Garcia
de Rincon, 539 F.3d at 1138 (“whatever relief might be gained by the operation of
§ 1252(a)(2)(D) and the “gross miscarriage” standard, it is unavailable [to the
petitioner] because [his] underlying removal order is an expedited removal order
that is subject to additional jurisdictional bars—8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A) and

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1252(e).”).
Finally, Carranza Carrillo’s motion to supplement the record (Docket Entry
No. 47) is denied.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

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