TIFARAH C. McDANIEL v. JIM MATTIS, Secretary, Department of Defense, Agency (DFAS)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TIFARAH C. McDANIEL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JIM MATTIS, Secretary, Department of
Defense, Agency (DFAS),
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 16-56560
D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01112-MWF-
PLA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 15, 2017**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Tifarah C. McDaniel appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in her action alleging federal claims in connection with her employment.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Vasquez v.
County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 20 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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basis supported by the record, Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1047
(9th Cir. 2009), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on McDaniel’s race
discrimination claim because McDaniel failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether she was performing according to her employer’s
expectations and that similarly situated employees outside her protected class were
treated more favorably, or whether her employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for terminating her employment were pretextual. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at
640-41 (setting forth prima facie case of discrimination and burden shifting
requirements under Title VII).
To the extent McDaniel alleged a hostile work environment claim, summary
judgment was proper because McDaniel failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether she was subjected to conduct that was severe or
pervasive enough to alter the conditions of her employment. See id. at 642 (to
demonstrate a hostile work environment, plaintiff must establish that the conduct
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and
create an abusive work environment).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on McDaniel’s

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disability discrimination claim because McDaniel failed to raise a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether she had a disability as defined by the Rehabilitation
Act. See Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2007) (a
disability discrimination claim requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that she “is a
person with a disability”; an individual who has “a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the [individual’s] major life activities”
qualifies as disabled).
We do not consider documents and facts not presented to the district court.
See United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts
not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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