Charles Gregory Reece v. Amrick Basi;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES GREGORY REECE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
AMRICK BASI; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-15432
D.C. No. 2:11-cv-02712-TLN-AC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 15, 2017**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Charles Gregory Reece, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and a due process violation.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Jett v. Penner,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment with regard to
defendant Basi’s treatment of Reece’s urological condition because Reece failed to
raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Basi consciously disregarded
a serious risk to Reece’s health in treating his condition with prescription
medication, and acted deliberately to deprive Reece of his right to make informed
decisions about his medical care. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th
Cir. 2004) (deliberate indifference is a high legal standard; mere negligence does
not suffice); Benson v. Terhune, 304 F.3d 874, 884 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment substantively protects a person’s
rights to be free from unjustified intrusions to the body, to refuse unwanted
medical treatment and to receive sufficient information to exercise these rights
intelligently.” (citation omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment with regard to
defendants’ treatment of Reece’s vision problems because Reece failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any delay in treatment resulted in
substantial harm so as to constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See
Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 746 (9th Cir. 2002) (a delay of medical treatment
evinces deliberate indifference to a serious medical need only if the delay leads to
further injury).

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The district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on Reece’s motion to
compel defendant Basi’s work records. See id. at 751 (setting forth standard of
review and explaining district court’s broad discretion to deny discovery).
AFFIRMED.

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