Donna M. Carroll v. United States of America

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DONNA M. CARROLL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 17-35265
D.C. No. 3:13-cv-00223-SLG
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Sharon L. Gleason, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 15, 2017**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Donna M. Carroll appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment after a
bench trial in her Federal Tort Claims Act action alleging battery by a doctor. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for clear error the district
court’s findings of fact. Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 17-35265
843 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court did not clearly err in its factual findings because they were
“plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Husain v. Olympic
Airways, 316 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]f the district court’s findings are
plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the appellate court cannot
reverse even if it is convinced it would have found differently.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in its trial management
decisions, including the mode of cross-examination at trial or allowing a witness to
testify by telephone. See Fed. R. Evid. 611(a)(1)-(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a); see
also Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 941-42 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth
standard of review); S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 807 (9th Cir.
2002) (“[W]e will reverse a district court’s litigation management decisions only if
it abused its discretion, or if the procedures deprived the litigant of due process of
law within the meaning of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.” (citation
omitted)); United States v. Goode, 814 F.2d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir. 1987) (district
court’s discretion in conducting trials “is to be limited only when a party’s rights
are somehow prejudiced”).
We reject as unsupported by the record Carroll’s contentions that dismissed
defendants were required to respond to the summons, that the district court
overlooked evidence at trial, and that the district court was biased against Carroll.

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We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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