Vincent U. Solomon v. Barajas;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VINCENT U. SOLOMON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BARAJAS; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 14-17041
14-17188
D.C. No. 2:10-cv-02103-WBS-AC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 15, 2017**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Vincent U. Solomon appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various
constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291. We review de
novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 22 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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The district court properly granted summary judgment on Solomon’s
deliberate indifference claim against defendant Dr. Tate because Solomon failed to
raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Dr. Tate was deliberately
indifferent in treating Solomon’s pain. See id. at 1058-60 (a prison official is
deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk
to an inmate’s health; medical malpractice, negligence, or a difference of opinion
concerning the course of treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference);
McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.3d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A defendant must
purposefully ignore or fail to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need
in order for deliberate indifference to be established.”), overruled on other grounds
by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Solomon’s motion
to appoint counsel because Solomon did not demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement for
appointment of counsel).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

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appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We do not consider documents not presented to the district court because
they are not part of the record on appeal. United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874
(9th Cir. 1990).
AFFIRMED.

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