Ariadna Almazan Ocampo v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ARIADNA ALMAZAN OCAMPO,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
Nos. 14-70534
14-71832
Agency No. A075-752-274
MEMORANDUM*
On Petitions for Review of Orders of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 18, 2017**
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
In these consolidated petitions for review, Ariadna Almazan Ocampo, a
native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (“BIA”) orders dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s
removal order, and denying a motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction under
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 20 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a continuance and
review de novo questions of law. Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir.
2009). We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. Singh v.
Holder, 771 F.3d 647, 650 (9th Cir. 2014). We deny the petitions for review.
Almazan Ocampo has not established prejudice from the agency’s decision
to decline to consider new evidence of hardship to her qualifying relatives, where
she has not shown what evidence she would have presented. See Padilla-Martinez
v. Holder, 770 F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 2014) (“To prevail on a due-process claim, a
petitioner must demonstrate both a violation of rights and prejudice.”).
The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Almazan Ocampo a
continuance to seek Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, where she had not
shown she was eligible for such relief. See Ahmed, 569 F.3d at 1012 (listing factors
to consider when reviewing the denial of a continuance).
Almazan Ocampo moved to reopen so that she could pursue an I-601A
provisional waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e). At that time,
an individual who had been in removal proceedings was eligible for the waiver
only if the agency had administratively closed proceedings, instead of entering a
removal order. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e)(4) (2013). However, an update to the
regulations, effective August 29, 2016, allows individuals with a final order of
removal to pursue an I-601A provisional waiver with consent to reapply for

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admission under INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) and 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(j). Accordingly, we
deny the petition with regard to the motion to reopen as moot.
PETITIONS FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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