Lisa L. Rios v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LISA L. RIOS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 15-35627
D.C. No. 4:14-cv-00078-JTJ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
John T. Johnston, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 18, 2017**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and TROTT and SILVERMAN, Circuit
Judges
Lisa Rios appeals the district court’s decision affirming the Commissioner of
Social Security’s denial of Rios’s application for supplemental security income
under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 20 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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§ 1291. We review de novo, Ghanim v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir.
2014), and we affirm.
The ALJ identified specific, clear and convincing reasons that are supported
by substantial evidence for discounting Rios’s credibility regarding the debilitating
effects of her symptoms: (1) the objective medical evidence did not support Rios’s
allegations; (2) there were inconsistencies between Rios’s subjective complaints
and her activities of daily living; (3) the treatment records did not reflect
significant complaints; and (4) Rios had a poor work history prior to the alleged
onset date. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (listing
among proper considerations for credibility assessment an engagement in activities
of daily living that are inconsistent with the alleged symptoms); Brown-Hunter v.
Colvin, 806 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that ALJ must support her reasoning
in rejecting subjective testimony with sufficient specificity so that the reviewing
court can conduct a meaningful review).
The Commissioner’s determination at Step Two in the sequential evaluation
process is supported by substantial evidence. Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 687
(9th Cir. 2005). The ALJ reasonably found that Rios’s depression was not a severe
impairment because: (1) the objective evidence showed little-to-no treatment, no
outpatient care, and no psychiatric hospitalizations; (2) mini-mental status
evaluations in connection with medical visits for physical issues routinely noted no

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psychological abnormalities; (3) she self-reported “mild” depressive symptoms and
a fairly-wide range of daily activities; and (4) the record supports no more than
mild limitations in daily activities, social functioning, or
concentration/persistence/pace due to any mental condition. The ALJ had no duty
to develop the record because the administrative record before the ALJ was neither
ambiguous nor inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of Rios’s depression.
Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-460 (9th Cir. 2001).
At Step Three, the ALJ properly found that Rios does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the
severity of a listed impairment. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir.
1999). Rios’s conclusory argument does not suffice to establish that her
impairments meet or equal Listing 3.02A. Contrary to Rios’s assertion, the ALJ
specifically stated that she considered Rios’s obesity collectively with her COPD
symptoms.
The ALJ did not err in evaluating the medical evidence. Although Rios
generally requests a more favorable interpretation of the medical evidence, Rios
provides no explanation or argument and instead merely selectively summarizes
the medical records. The ALJ’s interpretation is a rational reading of the record,
and the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Batson
v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004).

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The ALJ included in the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment all
the functional limitations that were supported by, and consistent with, substantial
record evidence. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). The
ALJ based the Step 5 finding on the RFC for sedentary work that was supported by
the medical evidence that the ALJ credited. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d
747, 756–57 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that the limitations included in the
hypothetical propounded to a vocational expert need only be supported by
substantial record evidence).
AFFIRMED.

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