NIKI-ALEXANDER SHETTY, FKA Satish Shetty v. LSF9 MASTER PARTICIPATION TRUST, a Delaware Statutory Trust;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NIKI-ALEXANDER SHETTY, FKA Satish
Shetty,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LSF9 MASTER PARTICIPATION TRUST,
a Delaware Statutory Trust; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-55405
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-09362-SJO-FFM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 18, 2017**
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Niki-Alexander Shetty, FKA Satish Shetty, appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his diversity action alleging pre-foreclosure claims
related to a non-party borrower’s refinance loans. We have jurisdiction under 28
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 26 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal on the basis of res
judicata. Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Shetty’s action as barred by the
doctrine of res judicata because Shetty’s claims were raised, or could have been
raised, in prior actions between the parties or their privies, and those prior actions
resulted in final judgments on the merits. See id. (setting forth elements of res
judicata under federal law and noting that the doctrine of res judicata bars
subsequent litigation both of claims that were raised and those that could have been
raised in a prior action); see also Tahoe–Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1081 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Even when the parties are
not identical, privity may exist if there is substantial identity between parties, that
is, when there is sufficient commonality of interest.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Contrary to Shetty’s contentions, the district court did not err by deciding
defendants’ motion to dismiss without converting it into a motion for summary
judgment. See Skilstaf, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp., 669 F.3d 1005, 1016 n.9 (9th
Cir. 2012) (“[A] court may take judicial notice of matters of public record without
converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment . . . .” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We reject as without merit Shetty’s contention that the district court lacked

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jurisdiction to render judgment in favor of appellee U.S. Bank Trust N.A.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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