Kostyantyn Oleksandrovych Bulanov v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KOSTYANTYN OLEKSANDROVYCH
BULANOV,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 15-71605
Agency No. A098-131-865
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted January 8, 2018**
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, RAWLINSON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Kostyantyn Oleksandrovych Bulanov, a native and citizen of Ukraine,
petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board)
denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings based on changed country
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 22 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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conditions. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny the
petition.
We review the Board’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion
and will reverse “only if the Board acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to
law.” Martinez-Hernandez v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1086, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation
omitted). Where, as here, a petitioner files a motion to reopen based on changed
country conditions, the petitioner must demonstrate that “circumstances have
changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate
claim . . . now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.” Ramirez-Munoz v.
Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). The evidence of
changed country conditions must be material and must have been previously
unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
The Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Bulanov’s motion to
reopen because Bulanov failed to present material evidence of changed conditions
in Ukraine. Although the Kotler Report cites a few instances of ongoing
mistreatment and violence against non-Orthodox Christians in Ukraine, the Report
does not suggest that conditions for non-Orthodox Christians, or for individuals
refusing military service, are “qualitatively different” than in the years preceding
Bulanov’s original hearing. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir.
2010). In addition, even if we accept Bulanov’s assertion that the armed conflict

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between the Russian Federation and Ukraine has intensified since his original
hearing, Bulanov fails to demonstrate that any increased violence has resulted in an
increased threat of harm specifically for non-Orthodox Christians or conscientious
objectors. Ramirez-Munoz, 816 F.3d at 1229 (concluding that evidence of a general
increase in violence in Mexico was insufficient to demonstrate changed country
conditions where violence was not linked to an increase in potential harm based on
a statutorily-protected ground). Finally, Bulanov’s reference to instances of
discrimination and violence experienced by some non-Orthodox Christians in the
decade prior to his original hearing is not newly available evidence, and so does
not support his argument. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen
proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that the evidence
sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been
discovered or presented at the former hearing.”). Accordingly, the Board’s denial
of Bulanov’s motion to reopen was not an abuse of discretion.
Bulanov’s remaining contentions lack merit. We reject Bulanov’s argument
that the Board failed to consider his “new fear” of persecution based on political
neutrality because Bulanov never asserted political neutrality as a ground for
potential persecution separate and distinct from his status as a conscientious
objector, which the Board addressed. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677
(9th Cir. 2004) (re-stating the “well-known axiom of administrative law” that

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issues not raised before the proper administrative forum cannot be raised on
appeal) (citations omitted). Bulanov’s due process claim fails because it is
premised on the argument, rejected above, that the Board abused its discretion in
denying his motion to reopen.
The petition is DENIED.

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