EZELL ANDERSON, Jr., DBA Mom’s Choice Meats v. United States Department of Agriculture;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EZELL ANDERSON, Jr., DBA Mom’s
Choice Meats,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-15403
D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02307-JAM-CKD
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 16, 2018**
Before: REINHARDT, TROTT, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Ezell Anderson, Jr. appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his action seeking judicial review under the Food Stamp Act of 1964
(the “Act”) of the United States Food and Nutrition Service’s permanent
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 13 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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disqualification of Mom’s Choice Meats from the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (“SNAP”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo, Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d 1013, 1019
(9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Anderson
failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether personnel of
Mom’s Choice Meats trafficked in SNAP benefits. See 7 C.F.R. § 271.2 (defining
“trafficking” under the Act as including “buying or selling” SNAP benefits “for
cash or consideration other than eligible food”), § 278.6(e)(1)(i) (providing that a
firm shall be disqualified permanently if “[p]ersonnel of the firm have trafficked”
in SNAP benefits); Kim v. United States, 121 F.3d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that under the Act “even innocent owners” may be disqualified
permanently for trafficking violations).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Anderson’s motion
for recusal because Anderson failed to establish any basis for recusal. See United
States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard
of review and discussing grounds for recusal).
We reject as without merit Anderson’s contentions regarding his former
counsel’s allegedly improper conduct and the mailing of the magistrate judge’s
findings and recommendations to Anderson’s former counsel.

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We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); Smith v.
Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).
Anderson’s requests to remand this action for an award of attorney’s fees,
sanctions, or an investigative hearing, set forth in the opening brief, are denied.
AFFIRMED.

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