Joseph Ray Rice v. W. L. MONTGOMERY, Acting Warden

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSEPH RAY RICE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
W. L. MONTGOMERY, Acting Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
No. 15-55808
D.C. No.
5:14-cv-02145-AB-RNB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Andre Birotte, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 6, 2017
Pasadena, California
Before: RAWLINSON and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,**
District Judge.
Petitioner-Appellant Joseph Ray Rice (Rice) appeals the district court’s
denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Following a jury trial, Rice was
convicted of the first-degree murder of Delvon Williams (Williams). Rice
FILED
MAR 05 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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contends that his trial attorney provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of
counsel when he failed to object to or limit inflammatory criminal history and
gang-related evidence.
The California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that trial counsel’s alleged
deficiencies did not prejudice the outcome of the proceedings was neither contrary
to nor an unreasonable application of Strickland.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see
also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100-01 (2011). As the California Court of
Appeal observed, Rice’s identity as the man who shot Williams was not at issue
during trial; rather, the question before the jury concerned only whether Rice’s
actions were premeditated. As the Court of Appeal further noted, the challenged
evidence related to “the street terrorism charge and gang enhancements,” which
were reversed.
At trial, the evidence established that while at a nightclub, Rice overheard
Williams arguing with a friend of Rice’s. Rice became upset after hearing
Williams state that Williams was a “Blood” and a “Piru,” and that “he would
handle his business.” Rice thought to himself, “F--- that,” pulled out a gun, walked
1 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (explaining that to
establish prejudice the defendant must show “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different”).
2

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over, and fatally shot Williams.
Unquestionably, extraneous, gang-related evidence should never have been
presented to the jury. See People v. Pettie, 16 Cal. App. 5th 23, 44 (2017) (“Some
gang evidence relating to defendants may be so extraordinarily prejudicial, and of
so little relevance to guilt, that it threatens to sway the jury to convict regardless of
the defendant’s actual guilt.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless, given the evidence of Rice’s reflection before committing the
murder, see People v. Mejia, 211 Cal. App. 4th 586, 604 (2012), the California
Court of Appeal properly concluded that “it [was] not reasonably probable,
assuming the challenged evidence was inadmissible and, therefore, not introduced
at trial, that the jury would have reached a result more favorable to [Rice] on the
murder charge.” Because the California Court of Appeal reasonably applied
existing federal law when denying Rice’s claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel, habeas relief is unavailable. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101.
AFFIRMED.
3

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